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Energy Subsidies:  Worthy Goals,
Competing Priorities, and Flawed
Institutional Design
DAVID M. SCHIZER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States uses targeted subsidies for both “green” en-
ergy and hydrocarbons.1 These subsidies pursue worthwhile goals. 
But unfortunately, many have design flaws that make them less effec-
tive or even counterproductive.2 The goal of this Article is to show 
how to do better.
* Dean Emeritus and Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  In the
interests of full disclosure, I serve on the board of directors of a company that ships oil and
provides various services to offshore rigs.  I appreciate comments received from Louis
Kaplow, Yair Listokin, David Weisbach, Alan Viard, Jason Bordoff, Tom Merrill, Andrew
Hayashi, Dan Shaviro, Felix Mormann, Tony Caughlan, Jesse Greene, and workshop
participants at Northwestern Law School, the University of Virginia Law School, the
Georgetown Law Center, NYU Law School, the Tax Economists Forum, Columbia Law
School, Harvard Law School, the National Tax Association Annual Conference, and Yale
Law School.
1 Martin A. Sullivan, Tech Neutrality, Tax Credits, and the Gas Tax, 64 Tax Notes 619
(Feb. 2, 2009) (noting that every president since Jimmy Carter has proposed energy subsi-
dies).  These subsidies grew by 108%—from $17.9 billion to $37.2 billion per year—be-
tween 2007 and 2010.  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Direct Federal Financial Interventions
and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2010, at xi (2011), http://docs.wind-watch.org/US-
subsidy-2010.pdf.  During this period, renewable energy subsidies increased by 186% (from
$5.1 billion to $14.7 billion).  Id. at xiii-xiv.  In total, the United States spent $150 billion on
green energy between 2009 and 2014.  Jesse Jenkins, Mark Muro, Ted Nordhaus, Michael
Shellenberger, Letha Tawney & Alex Trembath, Brookings Inst., Beyond Boom & Bust:
Putting Clean Tech on a Path to Subsidy Independence 6 (2012), https://www.brookings
.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0418_clean_investments_final-paper_PDF.pdf.  As stimu-
lus funding was exhausted, these levels tapered somewhat.  See U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2013, at xiii
(2015), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf (“The total value of
direct federal financial interventions and subsidies in energy markets decreased 23% be-
tween FYs 2010 and 2013, declining from $38.0 billion to $29.3 billion.”).
2 Comm. on the Effects of Provisions in the Internal Revenue Code on Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, Nat’l Research Council, Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions 10 (William D. Nordhaus, Stephen A. Merrill & Paul T. Beaton eds., 2013)
(“[C]urrent tax expenditures and subsidies are a poor tool for reducing greenhouse gases
and achieving climate-change objectives.  The committee has found that several existing
provisions have perverse effects, while others yield little reduction in GHG emissions per
dollar of revenue loss.”).
243
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Specifically, this Article focuses on three sets of issues.  First, there
often is tension between our environmental and national security
goals.  Unfortunately, the economics literature on energy largely ig-
nores these trade-offs by omitting national security from the analysis.3
This Article takes issue with this approach and suggests ways to man-
age these trade-offs.  Second, this Article argues that subsidies are a
flawed way to deal with these costs, and shows that Pigouvian taxes
(or tradeable permits) are better alternatives.  Third, if Congress is
stuck with subsidies for political reasons, this Article offers a number
of ways to improve them.
One reason why the United States needs better energy policies is
national security.  Our energy choices—especially our dependence on
oil—affect national security in at least two ways.  First, the United
States faces increased defense costs in securing access to oil.  Second,
some oil producers are geopolitical rivals, who spend oil revenue on
terrorism, invasions, or nuclear weapons programs.
Yet the economics literature neglects these costs, because they are
hard to quantify.  For instance, when the United States deploys forces
in the Middle East, determining how much of this cost is attributable
to oil, as opposed to other interests (such as countering terrorism), is
not straightforward.4  However, difficulties in computing a cost are
not a reason to ignore it.  After all, climate effects are also uncertain,
but commentators still try to account for them. National security war-
rants a comparable effort.
This is especially important because trade-offs arise between na-
tional security and environmental goals.  For instance, increasing U.S.
3 See Douglas R. Bohi & Michael A. Toman, The Economics of Energy Security 54
(1996) (“Until an effort that yields a credible measure of the externality [associated with
U.S. military spending for oil import security] is completed, this externality is too uncertain
to be used in determining energy policy.”); see also, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Econom-
ics of Energy Security, 6 Ann. Rev. Resource Econ. 155, 168 (2014) (citing reports indicat-
ing that “U.S. oil consumption may constrain foreign policy,” but noting that “[t]hese are
important political issues that have been studied more by political scientists than econo-
mists”); id. (“An important area of future research is to assess whether and how economic
costs associated with energy market–induced constraints on foreign policy can be mea-
sured and analyzed . . . .”);Comm. on the Effects of Provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code on Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Nat’l Research Council, Hidden Costs of Energy:
Unpriced Consequences of Energy Production and Use 333 (2010) [hereinafter Hidden
Costs] (rejecting the view that “the true cost of oil does not reflect the cost of maintaining a
military presence in the Middle East”); Ian W.H. Parry & Joel Darmstadter, The Costs of
U.S. Oil Dependency 19 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 03-59, 2003), https://
pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4deb/8d7bccd001cbd76896cbdc63fa3d4d2675b6.pdf (”U.S. mili-
tary expenditures in the Middle East are in part the result of U.S. interests in securing its
flow of imported oil from that region, and therefore count as a total cost of oil-import
dependency.  However, many analysts do not include them when assessing the external
costs of marginal changes in U.S. oil imports.”).
4 See, e.g., Parry & Darmstadter, note 3, at 19-20.
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oil production enhances national security, but also triggers familiar
environmental costs.  This sort of trade-off has to be managed, not
ignored.
The best way to internalize dueling externalities is a Pigouvian tax
(or tradeable permit) for each one.  For instance, the United States
could have a national security tax, a carbon tax, and a pollution tax.
But instead, the United States has relied on targeted subsidies for par-
ticular technologies.
While other commentators have criticized this choice,5 this Article
offers a different critique, rooted in administrative costs, that is new to
the literature.  Since producers and consumers can increase (or de-
crease) negative externalities in many ways, the cost of increases (and
the reward for decreases) should be the same, regardless of how they
do it.  But this Article shows why consistency is easier for taxes (and
permits) than for subsidies:  While taxes would have to reach all
sources of harm, subsidies would have to reach all ways to mitigate
harm, which is a much longer list.
For example, identifying all goods and services that use oil, and thus
should be taxed, would not be easy; the tax would have to cover gaso-
line, diesel, jet fuel, plastics, and the like.  But reaching every step that
reduces the use of oil, and thus should be subsidized, would be much
harder.  A subsidy would be needed for driving more efficient vehi-
cles, driving less, driving slowly, accelerating evenly, pumping up the
tires, carpooling, taking mass transit, and much more.
Put another way, a tax could simply be added to the price of energy,
but a subsidy would have to reward a host of choices—not just about
which energy to use, but also about how much.6  To make a subsidy
comprehensive, then, the government would have to identify and
monitor all these choices.  As a practical matter, this is simply not fea-
sible.  Perhaps the literature has overlooked this disparity between
taxes and subsidies because it is not an inherent difference, but a
product of administrability constraints.
5 See, e.g., Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W.H. Parry, 2 Rev. Envtl. Econ & Pol’y 152, 155
(2008) (“At the margin, [a subsidy] provides the same incentives as emission taxes or cap-
and-trade, since every additional unit of emissions implies a cost to the firm in forgone
subsidy receipts.  Thus, these subsidies can bring about the same choices for input intensi-
ties and end-of-pipe treatment as other emissions pricing policies.  However, in practice
such subsidies are less cost-effective than emissions taxes or tradable allowances.”).
6 The point is not just that regulators have to quantify the benefit of these alternative
solutions—a challenge that is well understood in the literature—but that they have to iden-
tify and cover them.  Cf., e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian
State, 164 U. Penn. L. Rev. 93, 95 (2015) (“[I]n order to determine the correct command-
and-control rule, the regulator must know both the cost and benefit of the activities.  In
contrast, the regulator only needs to know the cost of the activity to determine the correct
Pigouvian tax.  It is not necessary to know the benefit.”) (footnote omitted).
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Unfortunately, taxing what should be discouraged is harder politi-
cally than subsidizing what should be encouraged, at least in the
United States.7  As a result, this Article considers various ways to
make taxes more plausible politically.
If these alternatives are not politically viable—so Congress is stuck
with subsidies—institutional design problems under current law need
to be mitigated.  For instance, this Article emphasizes the importance
of rewarding the desired behavior, instead of a proxy for it.  Other-
wise, the subsidy can have perverse effects.  For example, under cur-
rent law, Congress pays 2.3 cents for each kWh of electricity
generated with wind.8  To claim this subsidy, producers sometimes
generate electricity that no one needs, and then pay customers to take
it.9  This perverse effect arises because this subsidy rewards a proxy
(producing wind energy), instead of the desired result (replacing car-
bon-based energy).
Needless to say, in pursuing energy policy goals, the government
can use other policy instruments in addition to subsidies, taxes, and
permits.  For instance, environmental goals also can be pursued with
command-and-control regulation, “nudges,” and disclosure, while na-
tional security objectives also can be advanced with foreign aid, alli-
ances, treaties, intelligence gathering, covert operations, military
deployments, and the like.  This Article does not delineate the full
universe of policy instruments or offer a comprehensive analysis of
when each should be used.  Instead, the goals here are to highlight the
relevance of national security, to identify an advantage of taxes over
subsidies that the literature has previously overlooked, and to show
how subsidies can be improved, since Congress shows no sign of giv-
ing up on them.
Part II canvasses environmental, economic, and national security
market failures associated with energy, and shows how empirical un-
certainty and competing goals complicate efforts to correct them.  Part
III discusses political advantages of subsidies over taxes and permits,
and surveys targeted subsidies under current law.  Part IV identifies a
range of policy challenges in using targeted subsidies.  Some are new
to the literature, while others are familiar.  Part V considers effects of
energy taxes and subsidies on labor and savings decisions and distribu-
tion.  Part VI highlights this Article’s policy implications, and Part VII
is the conclusion.
7 See Steven Cohen, William Eimicke & Alison Miller, Sustainability Policy:  Hastening
the Transition to a Cleaner Economy 33, 56 (2015).
8 Notice 2015-32, 2015-20 I.R.B. 967 (May 18).
9 E.g., Daniel Gross, The Night They Drove the Price of Electricity Down, Slate (Sept.
18, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_juice/2015/09/texas_electrici
ty_goes_negative_wind_power_was_so_plentiful_one_night_that.html.
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II. WORTHY GOALS AND COMPETING PRIORITIES:  THE
ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY, AND NATIONAL SECURITY
The first step in evaluating energy subsidies is to consider their pol-
icy goals, which are rooted in the environment, economy, and national
security.  These goals are quite important, but accomplishing them is
especially challenging for two reasons.  First, the relevant harms are
uncertain.  Second, environmental and national security goals some-
times conflict.
A. Environmental Externalities
1. Climate Change
Climate change is perhaps the most common justification for subsi-
dizing renewable energy.  Fossil fuels and industrial processes caused
78% of the increase in greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) between
1970 and 2010.10  According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC), GHGs have warmed the atmosphere, so the
“period from 1983 to 2012 was likely the warmest 30-year period of
the last 1400 years in the Northern Hemisphere.”11  As the Risky Bus-
iness Project has observed, “the signature effects of human-induced
climate change—rising seas, increased damage from storm surge,
more frequent bouts of extreme heat—all have specific, measurable
impacts on our nation’s current assets and ongoing economic activ-
ity.”12  The risks include damage to coastal property, declining agricul-
tural yields in some places (possibly offset by rising yields in others),
less productivity from outdoor workers, shortages of water, and out-
breaks of disease.13  One way to mitigate these harms is to favor en-
ergy that emits fewer GHGs.  A subsidy for this alternative energy
should equal the marginal benefit of emitting fewer GHGs—that is,
the marginal climate harm this alternative energy avoids.
Nevertheless, estimating climate harms is difficult for five familiar
reasons.  First, the level of emissions from some activities is uncertain.
10 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report
Summary for Policymakers 5 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/
AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf.
11 Id. at 2; see also World Bank, Turn Down the Heat:  Confronting the New Climate
Normal, at xvii (2014), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentSer
ver/WDSP/IB/2014/11/20/000406484_20141120090713/Rendered/PDF/927040v20WP00O0
ull0Report000English.pdf (citing “growing evidence . . . that . . . warming close to 1.5°C
above pre-industrial levels by mid-century is already locked-in to the Earth’s atmospheric
system”).
12 Kate Gordon, Risky Business Project, Risky Business:  The Economic Risks of Cli-
mate Change in the United States 2 (2014), http://riskybusiness.org/site/assets/uploads/
2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_WEB_09_08_14.pdf.
13 Id. at 3-5.
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For example, when natural gas is extracted and transported, some es-
capes into the atmosphere and contributes to climate change.  Experts
differ about the magnitude of these “fugitive emissions,” and thus
about the climate impact of natural gas, and the benefit of using it
instead of coal.14  Second, even if emissions can be estimated accu-
rately, their effect on temperature is debated.  According to the IPCC,
past trends do not supply the answer because they “are very sensitive
to the beginning and end dates”; indeed, “the rate of warming over
the past 15 years . . . is smaller than the rate calculated since 1951.”15
Third, even if temperature changes can be forecasted accurately, their
welfare effects are hard to predict.  Some regions could suffer severe
or even catastrophic harms,16 while others could actually benefit (for
example, from longer growing seasons).  Fourth, and relatedly, there
is a vibrant debate about whether global or national welfare is the
appropriate benchmark.17  National welfare costs are considerably
lower, since the United States has fewer areas prone to flooding and is
cooler than much of the world.  Finally, since climate effects are un-
likely to emerge for decades, a discount rate is needed to value
them.18  A market rate yields a low present value, undercutting costly
responses today.19  Some defend market rates as the right benchmark
for comparing forward-looking investments.20  Others favor a lower
rate on normative grounds21 or argue that the real market rate is
lower than we think if climate change slows economic growth.22
14 Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydrau-
lic Fracturing, and Water Contamination:  A Regulatory Strategy, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 147,
166-70 (2013).
15 IPCC, note 10, at 2-4.
16 See Eric A. Posner & David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice 19-20 (2010).
17 See, e.g., Alan D. Viard, Comment Letter on Technical Update of the Social Cost of
Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866 (Feb. 26, 2014),
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/-viard-america-the-world-and-the-social-
cost-of-carbon_091659741639.pdf (arguing that a national measure is more appropriate for
unilateral actions by the U.S. government, since its primary mission is to advance national
welfare, while a global measure is appropriate for multilateral actions, such as global coop-
eration pursuant to a treaty).
18 Posner & Weisbach, note 16, at 144-68.
19 For example, William Nordaus uses a 5.5% discount rate, while Nicholas Stern uses a
1.4% rate.  This disparity is the main reason they offer very different policy recommenda-
tions.  Id. at 148.
20 See id. at 150-51.
21 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Climate Justice, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 985, 997-98 (2010).
22 E.g., Elizabeth J. Moyer, Mark D. Woolley, Nathan J. Matteson, Michael J. Glotter &
David A. Weisbach, Climate Impacts on Economic Growth as Drivers of Uncertainty in
the Social Cost of Carbon, 43 J. Leg. Stud. 401, 405-06 (2014) (arguing that the IWG mod-
els share one notable feature:  although climate damages can become large as a fraction of
output, they do not significantly alter economic trajectories); id. at 403 (“[W]hen we relax
the assumption of continued growth in the face of climate change, [the social cost of car-
bon] estimates increase, in some cases by orders of magnitude.”).
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Given this uncertainty, there is no consensus about the climate cost
of carbon.  While the IMF values it at $25 per metric ton of CO2,23 the
Obama administration uses $3824, and others have offered much lower
or higher numbers.25  Yet even though these costs are hard to mea-
sure, uncertainty should not be a reason for inaction.
2. Pollution
Pollution is another familiar negative externality from energy, and
thus is also a reason to subsidize cleaner sources.  For example, mining
for coal pollutes streams and disfigures landscapes, while burning it
causes smog and acid rain.  Nuclear power generates radioactive
waste, and accidents can emit radiation.  Oil pollutes land and water
when pipelines leak, tankers crash, and offshore rigs malfunction.
Different types of energy also can cause fires, explosions, and seismic
activity.  These various effects can harm human health, as well as
property.26
As with climate change, the magnitude of these effects is uncertain.
For example, there is a heated debate about whether hydraulic frac-
turing contaminates water, and how feasible it is to regulate this risk
effectively.27  The risks of nuclear power also are vigorously
contested.28
23 Int’l Monetary Fund, Energy Subsidy Reform:  Lessons and Implications 9 (2013),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf.
24 E.g., Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost of Carbon, Technical Support Docu-
ment:  Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis
Under Executive Order 12866, at 3 (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/inforeg/social_cost_of_carbon_for_ria_2013_update.pdf (estimating $38 per metric
ton of CO2 emission in 2015 and $43 in 2020, assuming a 3% discount rate).
25 See, e.g., Frances C. Moore & Delavane B. Diaz, Temperature Impacts on Economic
Growth Warrant Stringent Mitigation Policy, 5 Nature Climate Change 127, 127 (2015),
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v5/n2/pdf/nclimate2481.pdf (“Damages from cli-
mate change that directly affect growth rates have the potential to markedly increase the
[social cost of carbon] because each temperature shock has a persistent effect that perma-
nently lowers GDP below what it would otherwise be.”); id. at 127-28 (explaining that
“[o]ptimal climate policy in this model . . . implies a social cost of carbon several times
larger than previous estimates” of perhaps $220 per ton); Robert P. Murphy, Inst. for En-
ergy Research, The Case for a Carbon Tax Is Much Weaker Than You Think (Dec. 1,
2014), http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/case-carbon-tax-much-weaker-think/
(concluding that the optimal carbon tax should be zero per ton).
26 See generally Michael Graetz, The End of Energy:  The Unmaking of America’s En-
vironment, Security, and Independence (2011) (exploring the true cost of energy, and argu-
ing that these costs are not reflected in the price of energy consumed in the United States).
27 See generally Merrill & Schizer, note 14 (considering how to regulate the risk of water
contamination associated with hydraulic fracturing).
28 See Michael Totty, The Case for and Against Nuclear Power, Wall St. J. (June 30,
2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121432182593500119 (examining arguments on both
sides of the debate for and against the use of nuclear power).
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3. Rapid Economic Development and the Consumption of Finite
Resources
Unlike climate change and pollution, other environmental costs of
energy are not persuasive reasons to subsidize alternative energy.  For
example, although energy development can trigger “boom town” con-
ditions, such as traffic jams, housing shortages, and overtaxed public
services,29 subsidies for alternative energy are an oblique response at
best.  Instead, local governments should build roads, add new tolls and
taxes, provide more services, and the like.
Similarly, the concern that fossil fuels may eventually run out30 is
not a reason to subsidize alternative energy, since there is no market
failure.  As Harold Hotelling showed in 1931, the market price of hy-
drocarbons reflects their inherent scarcity.31  Producers have to decide
how much to sell today and how much to save for the future.  If they
expect to earn more by selling later, they will do so.  As a result, the
current price incorporates predictions about the future, including as-
sumptions about future demand, extraction costs, and substitutes.
Tighter supply increases hydrocarbon prices, creating stronger incen-
tives to develop alternatives.32
B. Economy
1. Four Market Failures:  Incomplete Property Rights, Network
Effects, Investment Inefficiency, and Energy Shocks
The case for government intervention in the energy market is
grounded not only in the environment, but also in the economy. Spe-
cifically, four market failures can justify a government role.
29 E.g. Jordan Malter, How the Oil Boom Changed the Face of Small-Town North Da-
kota, CNN Money (Feb. 4, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/04/news/economy/oil-
boom-infrastructure/.
30 Cohen et al., note 7, at 6 (articulating a principle of sustainability management that it
is better to create wealth in ways that do not use up finite resources).  Even though con-
cerns about exhausting the supply of hydrocarbons are longstanding—for instance, a
founder of Standard Oil dumped his shares in 1885, believing the world’s supply of oil was
nearly gone—new technologies have consistently been developed to access more.  See
Russell Gold, Why Peak-Oil Predictions Haven’t Come True, Wall St. J. (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-peak-oil-predictions-haven-t-come-true-1411937788.
31 Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. Pol. Econ. 137
(1931).
32 See generally Geoffrey Heal, Exhaustible Resources, The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008), http://www.dictio-
naryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_E000165 (exploring the dynamics of resource al-
location and efficiency in the context of exhaustible resources).
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First, intellectual property rights are not broad enough to afford in-
novators all the benefits of new ideas.33  “As a result, market forces
will lead to under-investment in R&D from society’s perspective,”
Ben Bernanke has written, “providing a rationale for government in-
tervention.”34  This argument is not unique to energy.  It is especially
persuasive for basic research, since “[t]he most applied and commer-
cially relevant research is likely to be done in any case by the private
sector.”35
Second, transaction costs and network effects in energy infrastruc-
ture can justify a government role.  For example, new pipelines or
power lines require rights of way from thousands of landowners, and
eminent domain is a familiar way to manage these costs.  Similarly, a
vehicle is more useful if filling stations are easy to find.  This is a key
advantage of petroleum-powered vehicles over natural gas and elec-
tric vehicles.  As a result, consumers hesitate to buy alternative vehi-
cles, and the resulting shortage of customers keeps more stations from
being built.  This chicken-and-egg problem—and the associated net-
work effect—can warrant government intervention.
Third, to justify subsidies, some commentators invoke a market fail-
ure known as “investment inefficiency,” which causes consumers to
under-invest in energy-efficient cars, appliances, or other technolo-
gies.36  This under-investment could derive from credit constraints, as
well as from cognitive biases or search costs that cause consumers to
overlook potential savings.  Since builders and landlords do not bene-
fit (directly) in cutting a buyer or tenant’s energy bills, agency costs
may also play a role.37  Nevertheless, the empirical evidence is mixed
about whether consumers actually do under-invest in energy effi-
ciency.38  Instead, hidden costs, instead of market failures, may ex-
plain why these investments are not made.39
33 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Promot-
ing Research and Development:  The Government’s Role, Address at the Georgetown
University New Building Blocks for Jobs and Economic Growth Conference 3-4 (May 16,
2011), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110516a.pdf.
34 Id. at 4.
35 Id. at 8.
36 See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Michael Greenstone, Is There an Energy Efficiency Gap?, J.
Econ. Persp., Winter, 2012, at 3, 19-21 (explaining how imperfect information leads con-
sumers to under-invest in energy efficient technologies).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 5.
39 See, e.g., Meredith Fowlie, Michael Greenstone & Catherine Wolfram, Do Energy
Efficiency Investments Deliver? Evidence from the Weatherization Assistance Program
(Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21331, 2015), www.nber.org/papers/
W21331 (finding that savings from home weatherization were overstated by predictive
modeling and did not exceed initial investment, due to unanticipated costs).
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The literature also overlooks a subsidy the tax system already offers
(unintentionally) to buy these technologies:  The return on these
purchases—reduced energy bills—is untaxed “imputed” income.  For
instance, assume one can spend an extra $1000 that saves $50 per year
in electric bills.  The $50 annual return on this $1000 (lower electric
bills) is not taxed.  Alternatively, one can spend $1000 less and invest
this savings in a bond, yielding $50 of annual interest, which pays for
extra electricity.  The return on this $1000 (interest on a bond) obvi-
ously is taxable.  This differential derives from administrability con-
cerns, rather than from a choice to subsidize energy efficiency.
A fourth justification for subsidizing energy—and, in particular,
sources that are unlikely to be cut off abruptly—is the harm from sud-
den supply disruptions.40  Indeed, of the eleven U.S. recessions since
World War II, nine followed a spike in oil prices.41  Energy prices have
this disproportionate impact because energy is an input in all goods
and services, and also is part of every household’s budget.42  Thus,
spikes in energy prices reduce consumer demand, discouraging busi-
nesses from hiring and investing.43
These effects may not be fully reflected in the market price of en-
ergy.  Although consumers may realize that using more energy magni-
fies their exposure to energy shocks, they are unlikely to focus on how
their consumption exacerbates the exposure of others.44  “When
summed across the 300+ million people in the United States,” Stephen
40 See, e.g., Exec. Office of the President, Council of Econ. Advisors, The All-of-the-
Above Energy Strategy as a Path to Sustainable Economic Growth 20 (July 2014), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/aota_report_updated_july_2014.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Energy Strategy] (“Historically, temporarily high oil price shocks arising from foreign
supply disruptions have cut GDP growth and reduced employment.”); Stephen P.A.
Brown & Hillard G. Huntington, Assessing the U.S. Oil Security Premium, 38 Energy
Econ. 118, 121-22 (2013); Metcalf, note 3, at 161 (“Whether the impact of oil shocks on the
economy is as large as it once was is a matter of considerable academic analysis.  Analyses
focus on factors such as the role of improved monetary policy response to oil shocks com-
bined with a decreasing importance of oil in the economy . . ., the interplay between oil
markets and other sectors (e.g. housing and automobiles) . . ., and the need to distinguish
between supply and demand shocks . . .”).  But see Nat’l Research Council, Hidden Costs,
note 3, at 328-30 (arguing that price shocks are costly, but do not represent externalities).
41 Brown & Huntington, note 40, at 118.
42 This effect is compounded if interest rates are increased to keep high energy prices
from aggravating inflation.  See generally Lutz Killian, The Economic Effects of Energy
Price Shocks, 46 J. Econ. Lit. 871 (2008) (assessing a range of theories, as well as empirical
evidence, about the effects of oil shocks on the broader economy).
43 See Ben S. Bernanke, Mark Gertler & Mark Watson, Systematic Monetary Policy and
the Effects of Oil Price Shocks, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 91, 122-24 (1997).
44 Brown & Huntington, note 40, at 121 (“[T]hose purchasing oil are unlikely to under-
stand or consider how their own oil consumption increases the economy-wide effects of oil
supply shocks.”).
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Brown and Hillard Huntington observe, “this small external effect is
significant in the aggregate.”45
2. Economic Advantages That Do Not Justify Government
Intervention
Successful oil and gas development and “green tech” also offer
other economic advantages, such as more economic growth and jobs.46
Yet although some invoke them to justify a subsidy, there is no market
failure.  As a result, a subsidy could induce too much investment,
draining resources from other valuable activities.47
Similarly, even though reducing oil imports has economic advan-
tages—by keeping wealth in the United States48—the case for the
government to pursue this goal is unclear.  Some want the United
States to use its market power as a huge consumer of oil (so-called
“monopsony power”) to cut prices by reducing U.S. consumption,
thereby saving money on imports.49  Yet, this use of market power
would actually create a market failure, instead of repairing one.50  In
addition, this strategy’s premises are outdated in three ways.  First,
even if this sort of intervention once could be justified by another
market failure—the power of OPEC—the cartel’s influence has
45 Id. at 121, 125 (estimating this “oil premium” at approximately $5 per barrel).
46 See, e.g., Thiemo Fetzer, Fracking Growth 1 (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Discussion
Paper No. 1278, 2014), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1278.pdf (“Every oil and gas
sector job creates about 2.17 other jobs.  Personal incomes increase by 8% in counties with
at least one unconventional oil or gas well.  The resource boom translates into an overall
increase in employment by between 500,000-600,000 jobs.”); Energy Strategy, note 40, at
15 (finding domestic oil and gas production contributed 0.2% to GDP growth, or 1/10 of
total economic growth, in both 2012 and 2013, and the figure is higher if one accounts for
spillover effects, such as greater employment in sectors that service the energy industry);
Jason Bordoff & Akos Losz, Oil Shock:  Decoding the Causes and Consequences of the
2014 Oil Price Drop, Horizons Dev., Spring 2015, at 199 (noting that decline in oil prices in
2014 is likely to increase GDP by 0.4%, and perhaps twice that when spillover effects are
considered).
47 Indeed, evidence suggests that green tech subsidies are a costly (and even counter-
productive) way to create jobs.  See Graetz, note 26, at 170.  A study on TPI Industries, a
manufacturer of wind energy equipment, concluded that TPI Industries had received subsi-
dies averaging $20,000 per worker.  Id. at 168.  Solar photovoltaic–manufacturing enter-
prises received up to $300,000 per worker.  Id. at 169.  Another $4 billion subsidy was spent
on producing and installing nearly 20 million “smart meters” by 2015, but the technology
would lead to the elimination of 28,000 meter reader jobs, while creating very few jobs
since the meters were mostly built overseas.  Id. at 169-70.
48 Cf. Energy Strategy, note 40, at 22-24 (noting that drain on purchasing power from oil
shocks is especially severe when energy is imported, since resources leak out of economy);
id. at 3 (noting that trade deficit as percentage of GDP is lowest since the 1990’s, and that
more than a fifth of narrowing of the trade deficit since 2006 peak is attributable to de-
clines in oil imports).
49 Nat’l Research Council, Hidden Costs, note 3, at 327-28.
50 Id. at 329.
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waned.51  Second, the influence of U.S. consumption on global prices
has declined, given our greater energy efficiency and the growing ap-
petite of China and others.52  Third, U.S. shale production has re-
duced U.S. imports from 60% to 20%.53  As a result, lower prices
cause a transfer to U.S. consumers not only from foreign producers,
but also from U.S. producers.
C. National Security?
In addition to environmental and economic reasons for the govern-
ment to intervene in energy markets, another justification is national
security.  This Article focuses on two national security costs:  first, the
cost of policing access to oil, and second, the use of oil revenue by
geopolitical rivals to fund policies that harm the United States and its
allies.
1. Defense and Foreign Policy Costs
First, since energy shocks cause economic disruptions, as noted
above,54 avoiding them has been a goal of U.S. foreign policy for de-
cades.55  President George H.W. Bush emphasized this tradition in de-
ploying U.S. troops to repel Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in
1990:
[M]y administration, as has been the case with every Presi-
dent from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is com-
mitted to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. . . .
. . . The stakes are high. . . .  Our country now imports
nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat
51 Bordoff & Losz, note 46, at 195 (“The American oil revolution . . . has vanquished, at
least temporarily, OPEC’s ability to set a floor on world oil price.”); see also Tim Worstall,
Opinion, Opec’s Problem Is That All Cartels End This Way:  Challenges, Chaos and
Cheating, Forbes (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/12/15/
opecs-problem-is-that-all-cartels-end-this-way-challenges-chaos-and-cheating/#1eb248f537
03.
52 Cf. Bordoff & Losz, note 46, at 194 (noting that China added 500,000 barrels per day
to global oil demand each year each year between 2002 and 2007, and that non-OECD
nations added a total of 1.3 million barrels per day during that period).
53 Id. at 195.
54 See Subsection II.B.1.
55 According to the National Defense Council, this policy began with the U.S. defense
commitment to Saudi Arabia during World War II.  Milton R. Copulos, Nat’l Def. Council
Found., The Hidden Cost of Oil:  An Update 2 (Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.ndcf.org/energy/
NDCF_Hidden_Cost_2006_summary_paper.pdf.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747610 
2017] ENERGY SUBSIDIES 255
to its economic independence.  Much of the world is even
more dependent upon imported oil . . . .56
In addition to Operation Desert Storm, the United States also has
fielded a significant naval presence in the Persian Gulf, operated mili-
tary bases there, maintained a strategic petroleum reserve, and of-
fered military and other support to various governments in the Middle
East.57  Some of these regimes have proved unstable, in part because
oil-rich economies tend to grow slowly and to fail at developing other
industries.58  To the extent that using oil has caused the United States
to commit more blood and treasure to national defense—and, for that
matter, to support regimes, make commitments, or adopt policies we
otherwise would not have favored—these incremental costs are a hid-
den price of oil.
For example, 383 U.S. soldiers were killed in Operation Desert
Storm (along with more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers), and the war cost
approximately $61 billion.59  The second Iraq war was longer and
more costly, with 450760 U.S. soldiers killed (along with 3481 contrac-
tors),61 and an overall total, including civilians, of approximately
165,000),62 and an estimated budgetary cost of $1.7 trillion (along with
another $500 billion for health care for veterans).63  If a portion of
these costs are attributable to oil, as some U.S. political leaders sug-
gest, these hidden costs of oil consumption are significant.64
56 George H.W. Bush, U.S. President, Address on Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait (Aug. 8,
1990), http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-5529.
57 See generally Middle East, in 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength, Heritage Found.
117-30 (2015), http://ims-2015.s3.amazonaws.com/Sections/12_02_AssessingtheGlobal
OperatingEnvironmentMiddleEast.pdf.
58 Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resources and Economic Develop-
ment:  The Curse of Natural Resources, 45 Eur. Econ. Rev. 827, 828, 837 (2001).
59 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf States covered approximately $36 billion of
these costs, and Japan and Germany covered approximately $16 billion, leaving a residual
of $9 billion.  CNN Library, Gulf War Fast Facts, CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/
15/world/meast/gulf-war-fast-facts/ (last updated Aug. 2, 2016, 1:24 PM).
60 Operation Iraqi Freedom, http://icasualties.org/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
61 Anila Daulatzai, Catherine Lutz & Ken MacLeish, Costs of War:  US & Allied Killed
and Wounded, Watson Inst. for Int’l & Pub. Affairs, Brown U., http://watson.brown.edu/
costsofwar/costs/human/military (last updated Apr. 2015).
62 Neta C. Crawford, Costs of War:  Iraqi Civilians, Watson Inst. for Int’l & Pub. Affairs,
Brown U., http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians/iraqi (last updated
Apr. 2015).
63 Neta C. Crawford, US Budgetary Costs of Wars Through 2016:  $4.79 Trillion and
Counting—Summary of Costs of the US Wars in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan and
Homeland Security, Watson Inst. for Int’l & Pub. Affairs, Brown. U. 2 (Sept. 2016), http://
watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/Costs%20of%20War%20through
%202016%20FINAL%20final%20v2.pdf.
64 Some U.S. government officials have invoked oil as a motivation for the 2003 invasion
of Iraq, although other motives have been emphasized as well.  “Of course it’s about oil;
we can’t really deny that,” said Gen. John Abizaid, former head of U.S. Central Command
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Yet for two reasons, the economics literature generally does not ac-
count for these costs.  First, military expenditures and foreign policy
commitments also advance other goals unrelated to energy, including
countering terrorism, discouraging the proliferation of chemical and
nuclear weapons, and protecting allies.  Isolating the causal role of oil,
as opposed to these other goals, is not easy.
Second, some commentators consider defense a fixed cost, which is
unlikely to change in response to limited shifts in oil supply and de-
mand.  As Gilbert Metcalf puts it:  “[A] marginal (or even in-
framarginal) reduction in oil consumption may not affect our national
security planning or spending significantly.”65
Based on these twin concerns, the prevailing view in the economics
literature is that defense costs are too speculative to be considered in
energy policy.  As Douglas Bohi and Michael Toman put it in a widely
cited passage:
In brief, a defensible estimate of the externality associated
with U.S. military spending for oil import security would re-
quire an in-depth analysis of what rationales exist for mili-
tary spending, how the level of spending has been affected by
changes in the volume of oil imports, and how the reduction
in oil imports would improve economic welfare.  No study of
these issues has been undertaken.  Until an effort that yields
a credible measure of the externality involved is completed,
this externality is too uncertain to be used in determining
energy policy.66
Others go further and conclude, as the National Research Council
does, that “the marginal cost is essentially zero.”67
It is true that military and foreign policy commitments spring from a
combination of motives, so teasing out the role of oil is challenging.
Yet, although we should not attribute the entire cost of U.S. commit-
ments in the Middle East to oil, it is equally misguided to attribute
none to oil.  More generally, we are not free to ignore a cost just be-
cause it is conceptually and empirically difficult to pinpoint.  The con-
and Military Operations in Iraq, in 2007. Antonia Juhasz, Why the War in Iraq Was Fought
for Big Oil, CNN.com (Apr. 15, 2013, 7:42 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/
iraq-war-oil-juhasz/.  Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan made the same
point:  “I am saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone
knows:  the Iraq war is largely about oil.”  Id.  Then-Senator (and later Defense Secretary)
Chuck Hagel said the same in 2007:  “People say we’re not fighting for oil.  Of course we
are.”  Id.
65 Metcalf, note 3, at 168.
66 Bohi & Toman, note 3, at 54.
67 Nat’l Research Council, Hidden Costs, note 3, at 333.
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trast with climate change is striking.  Even though climate effects are
uncertain, commentators still try to account for them.  The same
should be true of national security.
In addition, even if modest changes in oil markets have minimal ef-
fects on U.S. foreign and defense policy, major changes can make a
difference,68 and there has, in fact, been a major change in recent
years:  U.S. oil production has increased by 60%.69  This additional
production helped induce a 70% decline in crude prices from June of
2014 to February 2016,70 and has also eased U.S. geostrategic burdens
in various ways.  For example, imposing effective multilateral sanc-
tions on Iran was easier because the United States could replace Ira-
nian crude that came off the market.71  In addition, extra U.S. capacity
has provided a cushion against oil shocks.  For example, although in-
stability in Libya triggered a price spike in 2011, renewed instability
there in 2014 to 2015 did not cause another spike.72
More generally, even though the Middle East is wracked by war
and instability, oil is still cheap.  This affords the United States more
flexibility in deciding how to address this instability.73  While this ben-
efit is hard to quantify, ignoring it is not the right answer.
Whatever estimate we use for the national security costs of oil, the
government should apply it consistently in different policy areas.  It is
problematic to treat these costs as high in formulating defense and
68 The National Research Council acknowledged the significance of major shifts, even in
arguing that marginal ones make no difference.  Id.
69 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil, https://www.eia.gov/
dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpus2&f=a (last updated Sept. 30, 2016)
(from 5.48 million barrels per day in 2010 to 8.76 million barrels per day in 2014).
70 See, e.g., U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB, https://www
.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D (last updated Oct. 26,
2016) (reporting spot prices of $106.07 per barrel on June 30, 2014, and $32.74 per barrel
on February 29, 2016, resulting in a 70% decline in crude prices).
71 Daniel Yergin, Who Will Rule the Oil Market?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 2015, at SR6,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/opinion/sunday/what-happened-to-the-price-of-oil
.html (“Over a million barrels per day were . . . taken off the market by sanctions imposed
on Iran.  Without that big surge of shale oil from the United States, it is highly likely that
those sanctions would have failed.  Prices would have spiked, countries seeking cheaper oil
would have broken ranks—and Iran might not be at the nuclear negotiating table today.”).
72 In 2015, Libya produced only one-fourth of the 1.6 million barrels per day it used to
export.  Libya Needs Weapons to Defend Its Oil, Maritime Exec. (Aug. 17, 2015, 10:45
AM), http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/libya-needs-weapons-to-defend-its-oil
(“Today, the output is only 400,000 barrels and Libya is now OPEC’s smallest producer
due to the ongoing civil unrest.”).
73 For example, the United States announced in August 2015 that it no longer would
have an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf at all times.  Kristina Wong, Navy Reducing
Presence in Persian Gulf, The Hill (Aug. 16, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/de-
fense/251197-navy-reducing-presence-in-persian-gulf (“Although the Navy has maintained
at least one aircraft carrier in or near the Gulf for the last seven years, it is planning longer
periods where there will be no carriers there at all.”).
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foreign policy, but low in forging energy policy (or vice versa).  For
example, assume defense analysts value national security costs at 50
cents per gallon, and are considering a response (for example, a troop
deployment) that costs 45 cents per gallon.  At the same time, energy
policymakers, who value these costs at only 5 cents per gallon, are
considering a response that costs only 10 cents per gallon (for exam-
ple, greater fuel efficiency).  This use of inconsistent valuations can
lead the government to adopt the costlier (military) response, even if
a more cost-effective (fuel efficiency) response is available.
2. A Source of Strength for Geopolitical Rivals
There is a second way that oil can undermine U.S. national security.
In addition to imposing burdens on the United States, our dependence
on oil also strengthens geopolitical rivals that produce oil.  This can
happen in three ways.  First, rivals solidify power by using oil revenue
to reward key domestic constituencies.  Second, rivals fund their mili-
tary and, in some cases, terrorist organizations as well.74  For example,
when Russian troops moved into Crimea in March 2014, oil prices
were above $100, and had been for three years.75  Since Russia earns
68% of its export revenue and 50% of its tax revenue from hydrocar-
bons, high oil prices afforded Russia the resources to undertake this
operation.76  Third, the ability to stop selling energy—and thus to un-
dermine their customers’ economies—is a source of power.  For exam-
ple, Russia’s ability to shut off natural gas sales provides leverage over
its neighbors,77 and presumably is one of the reasons why Germany
has made major investments in green energy.  If relying on oil and gas
74 Graetz, note 26, at 254 (“Dollars we exchanged for oil have strengthened countries
that oppose us and have helped to fund radical Islamic institutions, including schools,
throughout the Middle East.”); Clifford Winston, Government Failure Versus Market Fail-
ure:  Microeconomics Policy Research and Government Performance 47 (2006) (“Given
recent tensions in the Middle East, it has also been argued that it is not in America’s
interest to import oil from hostile countries that may use the profits from their exports to
fund terrorist activities.”).
75 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Europe Brent Spot Price FOB, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/
pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s =RBRTE&f=D (last updated Oct. 26, 2016).
76 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Oil and Natural Gas Sales Accounted for 68% of Russia’s
Total Export Revenues in 2013, (July 23, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail
.php?id=17231.
77 See Nat’l Research Council, Hidden Costs, note 3, at 332 (“[C]ountries dependent on
imports subtly modify their policies to be more congenial to suppliers.  For example, China
is aligning its relationships in the Middle East (e.g., Iran and Saudi Arabia) and Africa
(e.g., Nigeria and Sudan) because of its desire to secure oil supplies.” (quoting John
Deutch & James R. Schlesinger, Council on Foreign Rel., National Security Consequences
of U.S. Oil Dependency 26-27 (2006), http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/
EnergyTFR.pdf)).
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strengthens geopolitical rivals in these ways, it generates additional
negative externalities.78
Not only does oil revenue facilitate the costly behavior of rivals, but
it also can play a role in causing it.  For instance, oil wealth can take
pressure off nations to modernize their economies and political insti-
tutions.  This revenue can enable governments to fund a police state,79
to depend less on the tax revenue (and goodwill) of citizens, and to
buy off dissenters instead of affording them political rights.80  Oil
wealth also can substitute for entrepreneurship, more diversified
growth, and the social rights they facilitate.81  Civil wars may also be-
come more likely, as competing groups jockey to control oil re-
sources.82  As a result, oil can make regimes more corrupt, unstable,
and repressive,83 although this causal connection is contested and is
likely to vary in different contexts.84
78 The National Research Council rejects this view, distinguishing between the bad acts
funded by oil revenue (which they concede have negative externalities), and the consump-
tion of oil that generates this revenue (which they argue does not).  They contend:  “U.S.
oil consumption that enriches countries with which the United States has differences is not
an externality.  Rather, U.S. consumption makes inimical actions possible.”  Nat’l Re-
search Council, Hidden Costs, note 3, at 331-32.  It seems like a semantic exercise to de-
bate whether the externalities flow from bad acts, or from the revenue facilitating it.  The
National Research Council offers this distinction to argue that we should target the bad
acts, instead of our oil consumption.  Yet, at least in some contexts, we will want to target
both.  After all, stopping some bad acts is easier if we reduce the resources available to
fund them.
79 See generally Michael L. Ross, The Oil Curse:  How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the
Development of Nations 1-26 (2012) (exploring causes and consequences of the “oil
curse,” finding that oil-extracting nations are generally less democratic and more secretive
compared with similar countries that lack oil).
80 See id. at 63 (“[O]il has kept autocrats in power by enabling them to increase spend-
ing, reduce taxes, buy the loyalty of the armed forces, and conceal their own corruption
and incompetence.”).
81 Michael L. Ross, Oil, Islam, and Women, 102 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 107 (2008) (arguing
that oil wealth impedes gender equality).
82 Paul Collier, Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa, The Beacon (Nov. 2009),
http://the-beacon.info/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Natural-Resources-and-Conflict-
in-Africa.pdf (containing an article that “originally appeared on the Crimes of War Pro-
ject’s website on October 2004”); Ross, note 79, at 145 (“Since the early 1990s, oil-produc-
ing countries have been about 50 percent more likely than other countries to have civil
wars.”).
83 Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 World Pol. 325, 325, 344, 356-57
(2001) (analyzing “pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and
1997” to show that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; that this
effect is not limited to the Middle East; and that other types of mineral exports have a
similar anti-democratic effect, while other types of commodity exports do not).
84 See generally Ross, note 79, at 1-4 (arguing that oil undermines democratic develop-
ment, describing and responding to critiques of this idea); see also, e.g., Ahmet T. Kuru,
Book Review—The Oil Curse:  How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Na-
tions, Brookings Inst. (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/10/
06-ross-oil-curse-kuru (critiquing Ross’ emphasis on secrecy as the reason why oil-rich gov-
ernments are more likely to be authoritarian, and his failure to focus on the lack of a
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While starving these oil-producing rivals of revenue diminishes their
capacity to harm the United States, it can have mixed effects on their
motivation to do so.  Some could respond by seeking a better relation-
ship with the United States, for instance, to secure aid, the restoration
of trade, or an end to sanctions.  In contrast, others could feel freer to
defy the United States—since they have less to lose—or could even
precipitate a crisis to rally (or distract) domestic constituencies.85
Thus, although the United States is likely to benefit from weakening
hostile energy producers, it is possible to imagine other scenarios as
well.
A low oil price can also be a mixed blessing for another reason.
Although it weakens rivals like Iran, it also hurts allies who produce
oil, such as Canada, as well as governments menaced by hostile insur-
gencies, such as Nigeria.86  Likewise, Egypt and Jordan could be de-
stabilized if Saudi Arabia cuts its support for them in response to
declining oil prices.  Yet, although these effects are undesirable, the
United States could offset them, for instance, by increasing foreign
aid.87
middle class or of developed political institutions); Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy:  Nat-
ural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes 1-36 (2008) (arguing that oil can promote both
authoritarianism and democracy, but they do so through different mechanisms, and em-
phasizing democratic trends in Latin America as a counterexample to the “oil curse” the-
sis); Thad Dunning, Endogenous Oil Rents, 43 Comp. Pol. Stud. 379 (2010); Anar Kamil
Ahmadov, A Conditional Theory of the “Political Resource Curse:”  Oil, Autocrats, and
Strategic Contexts 3 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics
and Political Science), http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/618/1/Aahmadov_Conditional_Theory_Polit-
ical_Resource_Curse.pdf (arguing that effects of oil on government are not uniform, and in
particular that states vary in percentage of oil revenue claimed by central government; and
using former Soviet republics to argue that effects of oil wealth on political institutions can
vary, depending on “[t]he spread of alternative political elites, relative size of the ethnic
minority with ties to a powerful kin state, and oil production geography”).
85 If commercial ties with the United States have a moderating influence, scaling back
these ties can be counterproductive.  But some reasons why commercial ties can be moder-
ating—such as the development of a middle class to champion internal reforms and better
relations with the United States—do not necessarily apply here.  As noted above, oil reve-
nue can stunt this sort of reform in many cases, instead of promoting it.
86 Yergin, note 71, at SR6 (noting that Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa
with the largest economy and oil revenue representing 95% of exports and 75% of govern-
ment revenue and stating that “its revenues are falling as it needs more money to fight the
Boko Haram . . . insurgency”).
87 The goal here is assumed to be maximizing national welfare, but the analysis may not
change much if the goal instead is to maximize global welfare.  For instance, oil price
shocks have adverse consequences for most of the world, although they obviously can be
advantageous for oil producers.  Destabilizing the Nigerian government presumably is bad
not only for the United States, but also for Nigeria and its neighbors.  While strengthening
the government of Iran appeals to its leaders, there are costs even within the borders of
Iran (for example, for dissidents), as well as for its neighbors.
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3. The Solution:  Slack Capacity Rather Than Domestic Production
To sum up, dependence on oil can increase U.S. defense burdens
and strengthen geopolitical rivals.  Therefore, in addition to environ-
mental and economic rationales for government intervention in en-
ergy markets, there is a national security rationale as well.
Although the solution typically sought by politicians is domesti-
cally-produced oil, this is not entirely responsive.  Even if the United
States imports no oil, U.S. prices would still spike if the Persian Gulf
were sealed off.  The reason is that European and Asian consumers
would bid up the price of U.S. oil if they could not buy Middle East-
ern oil.88
Therefore, the way to mitigate these national security costs is not
domestic production per se, but slack capacity in the global market.  If
supply is ample relative to demand, the sudden loss of one supplier is
less likely to trigger an energy shock.89  Prices also are lower, so geo-
political rivals earn less revenue.
While more production in the United States can create excess ca-
pacity, so can increased production in other stable and friendly na-
tions, such as Canada and Brazil.  These nations are unlikely to use
revenue in ways that harm the United States.  In addition, when new
sources of oil are tapped in stable parts of the world, unstable sources
represent a shrinking percentage of global oil production, which
reduces the likelihood and magnitude of shocks.90
Excess capacity arises not only from increased supply, but also from
reduced demand.  One way to ease demand is greater energy effi-
88 Bohi & Toman, note 3, at 74-75; Metcalf, note 3, at 157.  Admittedly, price spikes are
especially harmful when oil is imported, since they drain more resources out of our econ-
omy, but shocks are still disruptive even when oil is domestically produced.  Energy Strat-
egy, note 40, at 27-28 (estimating the magnitude of disruptions from oil shocks to conclude
that costs associated with importing oil represent only a fraction of economic harm—spe-
cifically, by one-half to two-thirds of the 0.5% estimated decline in GDP when oil imports
are high and oil prices increase by 10%).
89 Metcalf expresses skepticism about the importance of diversity of supply.  He argues
that if one existing supplier drops out, another existing supplier can make up the shortfall,
so “it is not clear that increasing the number of supply sources for an individual country is
especially beneficial.”  Metcalf, note 3, at 169.  But Metcalf’s argument assumes there is
still excess capacity in the system after some suppliers drop out.  Where does this excess
capacity come from?  Assuring there is excess capacity is precisely the reason to expand
and diversify supply.
90 Brown & Huntington, note 40, at 119 (“Nonetheless, oil security can be greatly af-
fected by the composition of world oil production.  A given geopolitical event occurring in
a region of the world is likely to remove a relatively constant proportion of the oil supplies
produced in that region.  Under these conditions, the increased contribution of unstable oil
supplies to world oil markets will lead to bigger oil supply disruptions and bigger oil price
shocks.”).  In contrast, Metcalf asserts—without explanation—that diversifying the supply
of oil would not affect oil shocks, although he acknowledges that having alternatives to oil
would do so.  See note 89.  It is not clear why the analysis should be different.
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ciency.  Using less energy offers the same national security benefits as
new production.  Fortunately, the “energy intensity” of the U.S. econ-
omy—that is, the amount of energy used per dollar of GDP—has de-
clined significantly, as has U.S. petroleum consumption.91
Another way to reduce demand for oil is to replace it with other
types of energy.  For instance, if natural gas can substitute for oil, new
supplies of natural gas create the same slack in the oil market—and
thus the same national security advantages—as new sources of oil.  In
the United States, replacing oil with other energy sources is easier for
some functions than others.  As a transportation fuel, oil is hard to
displace.  The “synfuels” program was an unsuccessful attempt in the
1970’s to use coal instead.92  More recently, ethanol and other biofuels
have made some inroads.  Efforts also are under way to power vehi-
cles with natural gas,93 hydrogen, and electricity.  But gasoline-pow-
ered cars still have the formidable advantage of a vast infrastructure
of fueling and maintenance facilities.
While the United States needs oil for transportation, it hardly uses
oil to generate electricity, power industry, or heat homes.94  Coal, nat-
ural gas, nuclear, and renewables perform these functions, offering na-
tional security advantages in sparing us from using oil.  Yet, more than
one source of energy can replace oil in these settings.  As a result,
there is not necessarily a national security advantage in using one, as
opposed to another.  For instance, if natural gas can substitute for oil,
there is less need for coal to do so, and vice versa.
91 For each dollar of GDP, the United States used 13,381 BTU in 1980, compared with
7328 BTU in 2011.  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., International Energy Statistics:  Energy
Intensity—Total Primary Energy Consumption Per Dollar of GDP, http://www.eia.gov/cf
apps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=92&pid=46&aid=2&cid=US,&syid=1980&eyid=2011
&unit=BTUPUSDM (last visited Oct. 7, 2016) (reporting BTU per year in 2005 U.S. dol-
lars); see also Jeremy Scott Diamond, Lynn Doan, David Marino & Dan Murtaugh,
America Is Shaking Off Its Addiction to Oil, Bloomberg (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www
.bloomberg.com/graphics/2014-america-shakes-off-oil-addiction/ (noting that the United
States has gone from using over 3.5 barrels per million dollars of GDP to less than 1.5
barrels per million dollars of GDP); Energy Strategy, note 40, at 10-11 (stating that petro-
leum consumption has declined since 2006 because of greater fuel efficiency and slower
economic growth).
92 Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, The Technology Pork Barrel 259-60 (1991).
93 Alternative Fuels Data Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/vehi-
cles/natural_gas.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2016) (“Natural gas powers about 150,000 vehicles
in the United States and roughly 15.2 million vehicles worldwide.”).
94 Bill Sanderson, Home Heating Oil Is Now Cheap, But Natural Gas Is Even Cheaper,
Marketwatch (Dec. 30, 2014, 8:35 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cheap-oil-who-
cares-homeowners-prefer-natural-gas-2014-12-18 (“Heating oil has been losing market
share to natural gas, electricity and other heat sources for years.  Only 6% of U.S. homes
used oil heat in 2012, government data show.”).
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D. Competing Goals:  The Environment Versus National Security
To sum up, a number of different market failures can justify govern-
ment efforts to favor or discourage particular types of energy.  Yet
although each of these market failures is important, solving one mar-
ket failure can exacerbate another.  A key challenge is that some poli-
cies that enhance national security undercut environmental goals, and
vice versa.
1. Oil
This tension is clearest with oil.  One way to reduce the national
security costs of oil, as noted above, is to develop new sources of sup-
ply in the United States or in other stable and friendly nations.95  This
additional supply shrinks the market power and revenue of geopoliti-
cal rivals, and also eases pressure to assure access to less secure
sources.  Yet, these national security advantages come at an environ-
mental cost.  More supply leads to more consumption, which gener-
ates more GHGs.  In addition, more production increases the risk of
offshore spills, water contamination from hydraulic fracturing, and
pipeline and tanker accidents.
Notably, another strategy for reducing the national security costs of
oil—reducing demand, instead of increasing supply—does not create
the same tension with environmental goals.96  Conservation and en-
ergy efficiency not only reduce national security costs, as discussed
above,97 but also have environmental advantages.  For instance,
greater fuel economy and better mass transit reduce emissions and
pollution.
A third strategy to ease the national security costs of oil—replacing
it with other energy sources—can also create tensions with environ-
mental goals, depending on which substitute we choose.  Some pose
greater environmental risks than others.  In addition, even if these
substitutes reduce the national security costs of oil, they could pose
national security risks of their own.  Natural gas, coal, and renewables
are considered in turn.
95 See Subsection II.C.3.
96 While the focus here is on the national advantages of energy efficiency, Sarah Light
considers the converse:  the energy efficiency advantages of national security.  Sarah E.
Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 879 (2014).  In particular, she
observes that the military has strong incentives to promote energy efficiency since it uses
so much energy, and that innovations developed by the military can be used by others.  Id.
at 884-86.
97 See Subsection II.C.3.
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2. Natural Gas
A decade ago, it seemed likely that natural gas would begin posing
similar national security issues as oil.  Domestic natural gas reserves
were dwindling and the United States was preparing to become a ma-
jor importer.  At the time, the world’s leading exporters were Russia,
Iran, and Qatar.98  As a result, importing natural gas would have pro-
vided another reason to police access to unstable regions, and also
would have provided revenue to geopolitical rivals.
These national security risks never materialized, however, because
of an unexpected surge in U.S. natural gas production.  Hydraulic
fracturing unlocked over 100 years of supply, and also slashed U.S.
natural gas prices from over $12 per mbtu in June 2008 to $2.28 per
mbtu in January 2016.99  This domestic natural gas—unlike domestic
oil—is largely insulated from global supply shocks for two reasons.
First, natural gas is much less integrated than oil in the global market.
While foreign buyers can buy U.S. oil,100 and thus can bid up prices
during a supply shock, they cannot buy U.S. natural gas because the
necessary infrastructure is not yet in place.  This will change by the
end of the decade, as projects are completed to liquefy natural gas and
ship it overseas.  But even then, the capacity to reroute domestic sup-
ply for export will be limited, especially for rapid shifts in response to
supply disruptions abroad.101  Second, even if international buyers buy
significant amounts of U.S. natural gas, U.S. prices should not increase
very much because U.S. producers can produce a lot more at nearly
the same marginal cost, either for export or for domestic
consumption.102
While this new supply of natural gas offers national security advan-
tages, its environmental impact is mixed.  On the positive side of the
98 Nasser Karimi, Russia, Iran, Qatar Consider Natural Gas Cartel, S.F. Gate (Oct. 22,
2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Russia-Iran-Qatar-consider-natural-
gas-cartel-3189154.php (stating that Russia, Iran, and Qatar provided one-third of the
world’s natural gas exports at the time).
99 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price, http://www.eia.gov/
dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm (last updated Oct. 26, 2016) (reporting monthly natural gas
prices at the Henry Hub distribution hub in Erath, Louisiana).
100 For many years, there was a ban on the export of crude oil, but refined oil could be
exported.  In December 2015, Congress lifted the ban on crude exports.  Skip York, U.S.
Lifts the Ban on Crude Oil Exports:  When Might It Matter for Producers?, Forbes (Jan.
19, 2016, 1:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/woodmackenzie/2016/01/19/us-lifts-the-
ban-on-crude-oil-exports-when-might-it-matter-for-producers/#2d34aa2c328d.
101 Bordoff & Losz, note 46, at 199.
102 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Effect of Increased Levels of Liquefied Natural Gas Ex-
ports on U.S. Energy Markets 15-19 (Oct. 2014), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/
pdf/lng.pdf (noting that U.S. supply curve is fairly flat); id. at 12 (“Across the different
export scenarios and baselines, higher natural gas production satisfies about 61% to 84%
of the increase in natural gas demand from LNG exports . . . .”).
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ledger, natural gas pollutes the air much less than coal.  In addition,
burning natural gas emits approximately one-half as many GHGs as
burning coal.103  Indeed, since 2005, GHG emissions have declined
more in the United States than anywhere else, and the substitution of
natural gas for coal is a key reason.104  Between 2005 and 2013, U.S.
GHGs from power generation declined by 15%, and U.S. GHGs de-
clined overall by 6.9%.105
But on the other side of the ledger, natural gas has environmental
costs as well.  It is itself a potent GHG, as noted above, and some
escapes into the atmosphere.  The volume of these “fugitive” emis-
sions—and thus the extent of natural gas’ advantage over coal—is de-
bated.  In addition, the U.S. natural gas boom relies on hydraulic
fracturing, which has prompted concerns about water contamination
and seismic activity.
To sum up, the domestic natural gas boom has clear national secur-
ity advantages, and its implications for the environment probably are
also positive, though not unequivocally so.
3. Coal
For coal, the environmental harms are worse, while the national se-
curity benefits are less clear or, at least, more contingent.  Coal pol-
lutes the air more than natural gas and probably emits more GHGs.106
In response, defenders of coal sometimes invoke its national secur-
ity advantages, since the United States has ample domestic reserves.
Yet, the boom in natural gas production has an important implication
that has not been adequately recognized:  As more natural gas be-
comes available, the national security case for coal becomes weaker.
After all, natural gas offers the same national security advantages—
since we also have sizable domestic reserves—at lower environmental
cost.
The best national security argument for coal is diversification.  If
the United States can no longer meet its energy needs with natural
gas, coal can fill the gap.  Indeed, so far natural gas has displaced coal
103 See, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions http://www.eia.gov/
tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=73&t=11 (last visited Oct. 8, 2016) (listing the pounds of carbon di-
oxide emitted per million BTU of energy for coal and natural gas).
104 Energy Strategy, note 40, at 32 (estimating that one-half of this decline is attributable
to substitution of natural gas for coal, and one-half is attributable to economic downturn).
105 Envtl. Protection Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2014, at 2-4 to 2-5 tbl.2-1 (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2016-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2016-main-text.pdf (reporting that GHGs from
power generation declined from 2400.9 million metric tons (“mmt”) in 2005 to 2039.3 mmt
in 2014, and GHGs overall declined from 7378.8 mmt in 2005 to 6870.5 mmt in 2014).
106 See notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
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partially, but not completely.107  U.S. natural gas production, however,
can increase further without a significant rise in natural gas prices, as
noted above.  As a result, the national security case for subsidizing
“clean coal” technology is questionable; instead, mitigating the envi-
ronmental risks of natural gas probably is a more promising strategy.
4. Renewables
While natural gas has environmental advantages over coal, wind
and solar energy are even better for the environment, since they emit
no GHGs or pollution.  As a result, there is a strong (and familiar)
environmental case for renewables.
Sometimes, proponents of solar and wind power also assert its na-
tional security advantages, but these are less clear.  After all, if na-
tional security were the only priority—requiring a domestic source of
energy other than oil—the United States could rely on natural gas or
coal.  For the foreseeable future, the contribution of solar and wind
power would be more limited.  They are less reliable than hydrocar-
bons (since the sun has to shine or the wind has to blow),108  and  also
still depend on government support (although costs have declined
substantially, rendering them competitive in some conditions).109
Given these limitations, the national security case for renewables is
that if we have to stop using domestically-produced natural gas and
107 Coal used to generate two or three times as much electricity as natural gas in the
United States, but in recent years natural gas has been catching up.  In April 2015, natural
gas generated more electricity for the first time, in part because cheap natural gas has been
causing utilities to add natural gas generators.  Housley Carr, Torn Between Two Fossil
Fuels—Coal vs. Gas in the U.S. Power Sector, RBN Energy, LLC (Sept. 9, 2015), https://
rbnenergy.com/torn-between-two-fossil-fuels-coal-vs-gas-in-the-us-power-sectoris.  In ad-
dition, the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan created incentives to reduce the use
of coal.  Envtl. Protection Agency, Overview of the Clean Power Plan 2, https://www.epa
.gov/sites/production/files/2015or08/documents/fs-cpp-overview.pdf (last updated June 27,
2016). But in March 2017, President Trump initiated an effort to withdraw the Clean Power
Plan.  Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Trump Moves Decisively to Wipe Out Obama’s
Climate-Change Record, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/na-
tional/health-science/trump-moves-decisively-to-wipe-out-obamas-climate-change-record/
2017/03/27/411043d4-132c-11e7-9e4f-09aa75d3ec57_story.html?utm_term=.8d9836653a64.
A different legal reason for utilities to decommission coal plants, the EPA’s Mercury and
Air Toxic Standards (MATS) rule, was invalidated by the Supreme Court in June 2015.
Mich. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2711-12 (2015).
108 With current technology, it is not feasible to store energy generated in favorable
conditions for later use, so renewables need a back-up power source, which usually is natu-
ral gas.
109 See generally Geoffrey Heal & Karoline Hallmeyer, How Lower Oil Prices Impact
the Competitiveness of Oil with Renewable Fuels, Columbia SIPA Ctr. on Global Energy
Pol’y (Oct. 2015), http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/energy/How%20Low
er%20Oil%20Prices%20Impact%20the%20Competitiveness%20of%20Oil%20with%20
Renewable%20Fuels_October%202015.pdf.
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coal for environmental reasons, renewables can help fill this gap (e.g.,
instead of oil).  But the real point here is that renewables have envi-
ronmental advantages—not national security advantages—over coal
and gas.  Second, when U.S. natural gas and coal reserves run out de-
cades (or even centuries) from now, we will need alternatives.  Third,
in the long run, environmental benefits of renewables could translate
into national security benefits by avoiding famines, droughts, and
other sources of instability from climate change.110  Yet, these national
security payoffs are uncertain and remote in time.
***
To sum up, the government has a number of environmental, eco-
nomic, and national security reasons to intervene in energy markets.
Yet many of the relevant externalities are hard to measure.  In addi-
tion, some types of energy generate both positive and negative exter-
nalities, requiring policymakers to mediate among competing
priorities.
III. CURRENT LAW:  TARGETED SUBSIDIES INSTEAD
OF PIGOUVIAN TAXES
The last Part surveyed the case for government intervention in en-
ergy markets, as well as the tensions between environmental and na-
tional security goals.  To balance these goals, Congress could use
Pigouvian taxes or tradeable permits.  But these instruments are
rarely used in the United States, even though they are common in
other jurisdictions; taxing disfavored types of energy has been harder
politically in the United States than subsidizing favored types.111  This
Part offers an example of how to use a menu of taxes to internalize
energy externalities, considers why subsidies are used instead, and
canvasses the hodgepodge of targeted subsidies under current law.
A. Targeting the Net Level of All Relevant Externalities:
A Menu of Pigouvian Taxes
Enhancing and diversifying the supply of oil (and, to an extent,
other energy sources) has national security advantages, but environ-
mental costs.  Each goal is important, so how can they be reconciled?
110 Graetz, note 26, at 158 (“[C]limate change could have significant geopolitical impacts
around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradation, and the further
weakening of fragile governments.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Def., Quadrennial Defense Re-
view Report 85 (2010)).
111 See, e.g., id. at 62-65 (discussing current subsidies for fossil fuels and advocating sub-
sidies for renewable energy).
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Ideally, both environmental and national security harms should be
priced, using Pigouvian taxes or tradeable permits.112  Each incorpo-
rates both private and social costs in the price.113  Four types of taxes
or tradeable permits should be considered.  For ease of exposition,
this discussion uses taxes.
First, a carbon tax (C) should apply to hydrocarbons and other
emitting sources.  Since C would be based on the GHGs they emit, it
would be higher for coal than oil and natural gas.114
Second, another Pigouvian tax (P) should internalize pollution.  For
instance, the P for offshore oil drilling would reflect oil-spill risks.
The P for coal would address air and water pollution, and so forth.115
Third, a tax (T) could be added for negative externalities from traf-
fic and congestion, including delays and accidents.  Estimates suggest
these costs are quite large.116
Fourth, another Pigouvian tax (NS) could internalize national secur-
ity risks.  The most straightforward approach is an extra tax on oil.  By
reducing consumption, and thus creating more slack in the system, NS
would ease pressure on the United States to police access to insecure
supply, while also reducing the revenue of geopolitical rivals.
112 Goulder & Parry, note 5, at 169 (“Apart from administrative considerations, the
most cost-effective approach is to introduce multiple taxes.  Each tax would be set based
on the marginal external cost of a different externality, which would yield appropriate
incentives to deal with each of the various problems (emissions, congestion, etc.) in-
volved.”).  A tax fixes the price, relying on the market to set the volume of activity.  In
contrast, tradeable permits determine volume, letting the market set the price.
113 There is a robust literature comparing Pigouvian taxes and tradeable permits.  As
long as permits are auctioned off for fair value, the results are largely comparable.  Indeed,
differences that are commonly invoked in the literature (such as the greater flexibility of
permits) often fade on closer inspection.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the
Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1 (2002)
(defending the superiority of corrective taxes, and noting that Martin Weitzman’s widely
cited critique of corrective taxes relies on the implausible assumption that they have to be
linear and fixed).
114 A range of implementation challenges have to be considered.  For example, a differ-
ent point of collection might be needed for each source, so natural gas would be taxed
when it is extracted, while oil would be taxed when it is refined, and so forth.  See Gilbert
Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 499
(2009).
115 In this spirit, the United States has a successful tradeable permit regime for sulfur
dioxide, which was enacted in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments to address acid rain.
Pub. L. No. 101-549, title IV, § 403, 104 Stat. 2399, 2589 (1990); see Dallas Burtraw, Inno-
vation Under the Tradable Sulfur Dioxide Emission Permits Program in the U.S. Electric-
ity Sector (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 00-38, 2000), http://www.rff.org/
files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-00-38.pdf; see also Cohen, note 7, at 59-
60.
116 See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Pinar Karaca-Mandic, The Accident Externality from
Driving, 114 J. Pol. Econ. 931, 931 (2006) (estimating that adding a driver to a heavy traffic
state, such as California, can increase the insurance costs of other drivers by $1725 to $3239
per year, and that a Pigouvian tax could raise $220 billion nationwide).
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In theory, a national security tax could be calibrated more finely, so
it is imposed only on oil from geopolitical rivals.  The goal would be to
force them to sell at a lower price.  For example, if the global price for
crude was $50, and a $10 tax was imposed on crude from a rival, it
would have to offer a pretax price of $40 in order to compete.
Nevertheless, this tax might prove easy to avoid, since identifying
the original source of oil is not easy.  In addition, like any sanctions
regime, this tax could not succeed if some oil-importing nations did
not impose it; then the targeted nation could still sell to them at $50,
or perhaps a modest discount.
Likewise, it is also tempting, but difficult, to impose an extra tax on
unstable suppliers, giving stable suppliers a competitive advantage and
encouraging them to increase production.  But again, if other nations
did not follow, unstable sources could simply export to these nations.
Another problem is that disadvantaging unstable suppliers (and of-
ficially classifying them as “unstable”) may destabilize them further.
Indeed, it would be challenging, and potentially awkward, for the
State Department to classify nations as stable or unstable—or, for that
matter, as friendly or hostile.
These difficulties would be avoided if the favored category was nar-
rowed to domestically-produced oil, as in some subsidies under cur-
rent law.  But this approach omits friendly and stable producers such
as Canada and Brazil, who offer comparable national security bene-
fits, as noted above.117
In any event, imposing a tax only on imports, or on imports from
some nations but not others, could founder not only on these concep-
tual challenges, but also on trade treaties.  If these issues could not be
resolved satisfactorily, the best we could do is an extra national secur-
ity tax on all oil.
So far, this analysis has assumed that energy markets are competi-
tive, but Pigouvian taxes could have different effects on monopo-
lists.118  For instance, they might respond to these taxes by raising
prices and reducing output.119  This response could mitigate environ-
mental externalities (by reducing consumption), while exacerbating
national security externalities (by protecting the profits of hostile en-
ergy producers).  Even so, unpacking the effects on monopolists is un-
necessary, since energy markets currently are competitive.  For
117 See Subsection II.C.3.
118 I thank David Weisbach for this observation.
119 Rajeev K. Goel & Edward Wei-Te Hsieh, Market Structure, Pigouvian Taxation, and
Welfare, 25 Atlantic Econ. J. 128, 132 (1997) (“[T]he monopolist decreases output when
faced with a higher tax.  While the expected level of social damage from production will be
smaller than before, the magnitude of the already existing monopolistic distortion from
underproduction will increase.”)
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instance, although OPEC sometimes has functioned as an effective
cartel, the surge in U.S. oil production has undercut OPEC’s ability to
control prices.120
To sum up, separate Pigouvian taxes could account for the costs of
climate change, pollution, congestion, and national security.  Under
this segmented approach, the total Pigouvian tax would vary for each
energy source.  For example, oil would be subject to all of these taxes.
Coal and natural gas would not be subject to the national security and
congestion taxes, but would be subject to the carbon and pollution
taxes (though at different levels).  Nuclear would be subject to the
pollution tax (and perhaps also a charge for securing nuclear power
plants), but not the carbon and congestion taxes.  Solar and wind
would not be subject to any of these taxes.
A potential advantage of this menu of Pigouvian taxes is that other
policies, and the administrative burdens and efficiency costs they en-
tail, would no longer be necessary.  For example, most energy subsi-
dies under current law could be repealed (although there still would
be reason to support research and development in energy, as in other
fields).  Likewise, fuel economy standards and various environmental
regulations of power plants could be scaled back as well.
At the same time, there would be obvious challenges in administer-
ing these taxes.  Quantifying the externalities is daunting, as noted
above.121  There also would be incremental administrative costs in tai-
loring individualized taxes in this way.  Given these challenges, the
best we can do is a rough estimate, which accounts for relative, as well
as absolute, levels.  For example, even if the externalities from natural
gas and coal cannot be estimated with precision, the environmental
harm from coal is likely to be worse, so the taxes should reflect this
difference.
B. Political Advantages of Energy Subsidies Over Pigouvian Taxes
While the government has compelling reasons to intervene in en-
ergy markets, and ideally would do so with a menu of Pigouvian taxes
or permits, this approach faces familiar political obstacles.122  To side-
step these political barriers, the United States has used targeted subsi-
dies instead.  This choice has policy costs, as Part IV shows.  Before
turning to these problems, this Section briefly considers the political
advantages of subsidies over taxes and permits.
120 See note 51 and accompanying text.
121 See Part II.
122 Cohen, note 7, at 55-56.
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1. Resistance to a Carbon Tax or a Higher Gas Tax
Forty countries have some form of carbon tax or tradeable per-
mit,123 and many nations have higher gasoline taxes than the United
States.124  But unfortunately, the political opposition in the United
States to carbon taxes, “cap and trade,” and higher gasoline taxes is
familiar.
A key challenge is that these regimes add to the cost of the targeted
type of energy.  Although socially useful, these added costs are both
salient and unappealing to consumers.125  Voters would constantly en-
counter them in filling their tanks and paying electric and heating
bills.126
This unpopularity with consumers is particularly significant since
U.S. political institutions are especially responsive to interest group
pressure.127  While these policies have many opponents, they have few
interest group champions.  For example, even though a carbon tax
would improve the competitive position of solar and wind energy pro-
ducers, they prefer the more immediate advantage of a subsidy for
their specific technology.
Higher gasoline taxes in the United States also are a harder sell
because mass transit options are limited and distances are vast in
many places.  It is easier to live without a car in Berlin, Paris, or Tokyo
than in Kansas City, Dallas, or Los Angeles.  As a result, the federal
gas tax has remained at 18.4 cents per gallon for over twenty years.128
The tax is supposed to fund highway construction and maintenance,
but the highway trust fund has been running an annual deficit of ap-
123 World Bank, Pricing Carbon, http://www.worldbank.org//en/programs/pricing-carbon
(last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
124 OECD, Taxing Energy Use 2015:  OECD and Selected Partner Economies 47 (2015),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxing-energy-use-2015-9789264232334-en.htm.
125 Graetz, note 26, at 252-53, 255; Steven Cohen, It’s Time to Abandon the Delusion of
a Carbon Tax, Huffington Post (Sept. 29, 2014, 8:26 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
steven-cohen/its-time-to-abandon-the-d_b_5899448.html (“No political leader responsible
for ensuring the material well-being of his or her people in the modern global economy is
going to willingly raise the price of something so central to that economy as the price of
energy.”).
126 See Neil Hume & Pilita Clark, Chevron Chief Lashes Out at European Oil Groups
on Climate Change, Fin. Times (June 3, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0625af4c-
0a10-11e5-82e4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3jfrOVvN0 (“I don’t think that putting a price on
carbon is necessarily the answer.  I’ve never had a customer come to me and ask to pay a
higher price for oil, gas or other products.”(quoting John Watson, CEO of Chevron)).
127 See Christine Mahoney, Lobbying Success in the United States and the European
Union, 27 J. Pub. Pol’y 35, 35-36, 55 (2007) (emphasizing greater electoral accountability
and availability of private campaign finance in the United States).
128 U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Office of Highway Pol’y Info., Federal Tax Rates on Motor
Fuels and Lubricating Oil (1), at 1 tbl.FE-101A (2015), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy-
information/statistics/2014/pdf/fe101a.pdf.
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proximately $10 billion in recent years.129  Even so, increasing this tax
is a political “hot potato.”130  As President Obama put it, “The gas tax
hasn’t been increased for 20 years.  There’s a reason for that.“131
2. The Political Allure of Energy Subsidies
In contrast, energy subsides have more favorable political pros-
pects.  Although a subsidy for “green” energy advances some of the
same environmental goals as a carbon tax—and a subsidy for oil pro-
duction advances some of the same national security goals as a higher
gasoline tax—these subsidies do not inflict pain by raising the price of
energy that Congress wants to discourage.  Instead, they lower the
price of an alternative that Congress wants to encourage.
In addition, although subsidies are salient to those who claim them,
they are largely invisible to the average voter.  Of course, higher taxes
or larger deficits are needed to fund these programs.  But voter con-
cerns about taxes and deficits do not usually focus on a particular sub-
sidy, since so many other programs are funded as well.
At the same time, organized interest groups enthusiastically support
these subsidies, hiring lobbyists, running campaign ads, and contribut-
ing to campaigns.  Indeed, several energy tax expenditures have been
extenders, which had to be renewed every year.132  This structure in-
duced perpetual lobbying, and thus an evergreen flow of campaign
contributions.
129 Sean Lowry, Cong. Research Serv., RL30304, The Federal Excise Tax on Motor Fu-
els and the Highway Trust Fund:  Current Law and Legislative History 5 tbl.3 (2015), avail-
able at http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL30304.pdf
(“Congress has prevented potential shortfalls to the HTF by transferring over $69.9 billion
(after sequestration) from Treasury’s general fund to the HTF. . . .  [G]eneral fund trans-
fers to the HTF have been scheduled seven times by six authorizing laws since 2008.”).
130 A carbon tax has become comparably toxic in Australia, which repealed it only two
years after enacting it.  After pledging that “[t]here will be no carbon tax under the govern-
ment I lead,” Prime Minister Julia Gillard agreed to a carbon “price” in order to form a
coalition with the Green party.  Julia Baird, Editorial, A Carbon Tax’s Ignoble End, N.Y.
Times, July 24, 2014, at A 27, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/opinion/julia-baird-why-
tony-abbott-axed-australias-carbon-tax.html?_r=0.  For this seeming about-face, the oppo-
sition branded her “Ju-Liar,” and she lost the leadership of her party.  Id.  Meanwhile,
Tony Abbott, the leader of another party, was elected in part on a pledge to “ax the tax.”
Id.
131 Russell Berman, The Tax That Dare Not Be Hiked, The Atlantic (Dec. 7, 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/the-tax-that-dare-not-be-hiked/383428/.
132 For instance, a number of these provisions were extended for two years in December
of 2015, including the production tax credit, as well as various incentives for biofuels, bi-
odiesel, and alternative fuels.  Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-
113, § 301, 129 Stat. 2242, 3038 (2015) (extending the production tax credit); id. §§ 184, 185,
129 Stat. at 3073 (extending credits for biofuel and biodiesel); id. § 192, 129 Stat. at 3075
(extending excise tax credits relating to alternative fuels).
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C. Targeted Energy Subsidies Under Current Law
Mindful of these political advantages, Congress has used a wide
range of tax expenditures to promote both alternative energy and
hydrocarbons.
1. Tax Expenditures Promoting Alternative Energy
Most tax expenditures for alternative energy are narrowly targeted,
supporting particular technologies.  The lion’s share were introduced
or expanded dramatically by the Obama Administration.  They focus
on three areas.
The first is “greener” electricity.  There are tax credits for energy
manufacturing;133 special accelerated depreciation rules for renewable
energy;134 and subsidies for “clean coal” facilities135 and coal plant
scrubbers.136  In addition, taxpayers can claim an investment tax credit
for investing in solar, wind, and geothermal energy production;137 a
production tax credit of 2.3 cents for each kWh of electricity gener-
ated from wind or geothermal energy, and half that amount for hydro-
electric and some other technologies,138  and the so-called “1603
program,” offering upfront grants in lieu of these credits.139
The second focus of these tax expenditures is transportation.  In re-
cent years, Congress has offered a $7500 credit for plug-in electric ve-
hicles,140 as well as credits for qualified fuel cell vehicles, hybrids,
alternative fuel vehicles, and advanced lean burn technology vehi-
cles.141  Congress also has provided credits for alternative fuels.142
133 E.g., IRC § 48C (offering a credit for businesses which establish, expand or re-equip
a manufacturing facility for the production of renewable energy); see Staff of the Joint
Comm. on Tax’n, 115th Cong., JCX-3-17, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2016-2020, at 29 tbl.1 (2016), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown
&id=4971.
134 IRC § 168(e)(3)(B)(vi) (classifying a number of renewable energy technologies as
five-year property); see Joint Comm., note 133, at 30.
135 IRC §§ 48A, 48B (providing tax credits for qualifying advanced coal and gasification
projects); See Joint Comm., note 133, at 29 $200 million in 2016).
136 IRC §§ 169, 291.
137 IRC § 48; Joint Committee, note 133, at 29 tbl.1 ($2.6 billion in 2016).
138 IRC § 45; Joint Committee, note 133, at 29 tbl.1 ($3.3 billion in 2016); see also U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (PTC), http://energy.gov/
savings/renewable-electricity-production-tax-credit-ptc (last visited Nov. 21, 2016) (listing
the production tax credit as adjusted for inflation).
139 As of July 31, 2016, $24.9 billion of Section 1603 grants had been dispensed.  Treasury
Dep’t, Overview and Status Update of the § 1603 Program 1 (2016), https://www.treasury
.gov/initiatives/recovery/Documents/STATUS%20OVERVIEW.pdf.
140 IRC § 30B.
141 See, e.g., IRC § 30D.
142 IRC § 5626.
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Until 2012, there was a credit for ethanol as well.143  Tax expenditures
also have supported natural gas fueling stations, idling reduction units
in trucks, transit passes, and bicycle commuting.144
A third set of tax expenditures promotes energy efficiency, includ-
ing heating and cooling systems, appliances, and insulation in newly-
constructed homes, existing homes, and commercial properties.145  In
addition, utilities can offer tax-free rewards to consumers for making
energy efficient investments.146
3. Tax Expenditures to Increase and Diversify the Supply of
Hydrocarbons
While alternative energy subsidies are mostly of recent vintage, hy-
drocarbon subsidies survive from an earlier era.  A few focus on con-
sumption (for example, commuter parking), but most are for
producers.
These tax expenditures are broader than their alternative energy
counterparts, targeting expansive categories of hydrocarbon produc-
tion instead of particular technologies.  The most plausible policy jus-
tification for them is national security, although they also reflect the
industry’s political clout.  To induce more production—adding stable
sources of supply and reducing the revenue of geopolitical rivals—the
tax bill on production is cut in four ways.
The first are special cost recovery rules, which apply only to U.S.
production.  Ordinarily, when income-producing assets are created,
costs cannot be deducted immediately.  Instead a portion is deducted
each year of the asset’s useful life.147  In contrast, an immediate de-
duction is offered for costs of drilling wells in the United States, in-
cluding wages, supplies, and fuel.148 In addition, accelerated
depreciation is available for geological and geophysical expenses of
U.S. wells.149 Percentage depletion is another special deduction, which
is available only to “independent” producers (who do not have refin-
143 IRC § 6426(b) (expired January 1, 2012); see Robert Pear, After Three Decades, Tax
Credit for Ethanol Expires, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2012, at A11, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
01/02/business/energy-environment/after-three-decades-federal-tax-credit-for-ethanol-ex-
pires.html.
144 IRC § 30C (credit for alternative fuel vehicle refueling property), § 4053(9) (excise
tax exemption for idling reduction units), § 132(f)(1) (exemption for transit passes and
bicycle commuting reimbursements).
145 IRC §§ 25C, 25D.  The Joint Committee estimated the cost of subsidies for energy
efficiency in homes at $1.6 billion in 2016.  Joint Committee, note 133, at 29-30 tbl.1.
146 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Tax Credits, Rebates & Savings, https://energy.gov/savings
(last visited Feb. 2, 2017) (listing utility programs and other incentives by state).
147 See, e.g., IRC § 168.
148 IRC §§ 616, 617; Joint Committee, note 133, at 30 tbl.1 ($1.8 billion in 2016).
149 IRC § 167(h); Joint Committee, note 133, at 30 tbl.1 ($100 million in 2016).
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eries or retail distribution) and royalty owners.150  It allows producers
to deduct a designated percentage of revenue, which is assumed to
reflect the decline in reserves over time (for example, 15% for oil).151
It is especially generous because it can exceed a producer’s actual
costs.  The oil and gas industry defends these cost-recovery rules as
comparable to tax benefits claimed by other industries, such as R&D
deductions for the pharmaceutical industry.152
Second, oil and gas producers are sometimes taxed at a reduced
rate.  The rate reduction for domestic manufacturing (31.85% instead
of 35%) applies to domestic oil and gas producers.153  In addition,
publicly traded partnerships that hold exploration, refining, and pipe-
line assets do not pay corporate tax.154  This tax benefit is not limited
to domestic production.155
Third, targeted tax credits are offered for exploration and produc-
tion when energy prices are low.  Section 45K funds unconventional
production.156  The marginal well production credit157 and enhanced
oil recovery tax credit158 subsidize low-producing or high-cost U.S.
wells.  In recent years, high energy prices have rendered these credits
unavailable.
Fourth, multinational oil companies receive especially generous
treatment for deals they strike with foreign governments.  Multina-
tionals usually have to pay both taxes and royalties to these govern-
ments.  The U.S. offers a tax credit for taxes (so income is not taxed
twice), but not for royalties.159  Given this difference, producers obvi-
ously prefer to classify payments as taxes.  If this planning strategy
succeeds—so the U.S. government bears the cost—producers have
150 IRC § 613A(d)(2), (4); Joint Committee, note 133 at 30 tbl.1 ($700 million in 2016).
151 IRC §§ 611, 613, 613A.
152 Oil and Gas Tax Incentives and Rising Energy Prices: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Fin., 112th Cong. 8-9 (2011) (statement of John Watson, Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer, Chevron Corporation), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/
gpo29708/75747.pdf.
153 IRC § 199 (allowing a 9% deduction, which translates into a reduced rate of (9 x .35)
or 3.15%).
154 IRC § 7704.
155 Joint Committee, note 133, at 30 tbl.1 ($900 million in 2016).  Cf. Sean T. Wheeler &
C. Timothy Fenn, Ten Offshore MLP Facts, Latham & Watkins (2013), https://www.lw
.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-offshore-MLP-facts (noting that foreign assets often are
placed in foreign partnerships that elect to be treated as corporations for U.S. tax pur-
poses, and that these assets avoid U.S. entity-level tax by being outside the United States).
156 This includes oil from shale or tar sands, coal seams, or other “tight” formations, as
well as biomass and synthetic fuels from coal.  IRC § 45K(c).  This credit is often called the
“old Section 29 credit” because of its former position in the Code.
157 IRC § 45I.
158 IRC § 43.
159 IRC § 901.
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less incentive to resist high royalties,160 and U.S. tax dollars are rer-
outed to foreign governments.  This is particularly unfortunate when
the foreign government is a geopolitical rival, which uses revenue in
ways that undercut U.S. interests.  Yet, a favorable judicial decision
for Exxon has enabled producers to claim foreign tax credits for what
arguably are royalties.161
III. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN CHALLENGES WITH TARGETED SUBSIDIES
While the government has good reasons to intervene in energy mar-
kets, the last Part showed that political dynamics in the U.S. favor
subsidies over taxes and permits.  In some ways, these instruments are
similar.  They all use prices to create incentives, instead of mandating
or prohibiting particular practices.  This flexibility can promote com-
petition and innovation.162
However, although energy subsidies have political advantages, they
have important policy disadvantages.  While other commentators also
favor taxes over subsidies, this Part identifies a number of problems
with subsidies that are new to the literature, including administrative
challenges in covering all the relevant behavior.  This Part also sug-
gests ways to mitigate some of these problems, if Congress is stuck
with targeted subsidies for political reasons.
160 One reason the multinational might care is that it can defer U.S. tax by not immedi-
ately repatriating foreign earnings.  This means it relies on a (deferred) U.S. foreign tax
credit to compensate for a (current) foreign tax.  Under “new view” assumptions, the de-
ferred credit could still fully compensate for the current tax (for example, if after-tax re-
turns are the same everywhere and the repatriation tax at a fixed rate is inevitable).  Daniel
N. Shaviro, Fixing U.S. International Taxation 82-85 (2014).  Yet, this is no longer the
case—so firms will, in fact, seek to reduce their foreign taxes (as, indeed, many do)—if
these assumptions no longer hold.  Id. at 85-87.
161 Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 338 (1999) (applying “dual capacity” rules to
treat as a creditable tax a payment that the Treasury considered a royalty); see also Philips
Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 256 (1995); Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax’n,
112th Cong., JCX-27-11, Description of Present Law and Select Proposals Relating to the
Oil and Gas Industry 16 (2011), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=start
down&id=3787 (“Subsequent to the decision in Exxon, anecdotal evidence suggests that a
significant number of dual-capacity taxpayers revoked their safe harbor elections and
adopted the facts and circumstances method to argue for tax treatment for the entire
amount of the qualifying levy.”).  The Obama Administration proposed to modify the tax
rules for dual capacity taxpayers by limiting the creditable tax to the portion of a foreign
“levy” that does not exceed the foreign levy the taxpayer would pay if it were not a dual
capacity taxpayer.  Treasury Dep’t., General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal
Year 2016 Revenue Proposals 26-27 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf.
162 See Goulder & Parry, note 5, at 163, 166-68; see also Kate Gordon, Why Renewable
Energy Still Needs Subsidies, Wall St. J.:  Experts, Sept. 14, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/ex-
perts/2015/09/14/why-renewable-energy-still-needs-subsidies/.
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A. Covering All Relevant Behavior:  A Particular
Challenge for Subsidies
By incorporating externalities in prices, energy taxes and subsidies
force producers and consumers to account for the full social cost of
each energy source in deciding how much to use.  To accomplish this
goal, taxes (and permit prices) should equal the marginal harm caused
by the taxed behavior.  Likewise, the subsidy should equal the margi-
nal harm avoided by the subsidized activity.
Producers and consumers, however, will not make optimal choices
if externalities are internalized only some of the time.  For example, a
carbon tax that covers natural gas and oil, but not coal, would en-
courage greater use of coal.  To avoid counterproductive outcomes,
taxes, permits, and subsidies have to treat harms the same way, wher-
ever they arise.  The literature calls this goal “tech neutrality.”163  A
core contribution of this Article is to show why a tech-neutral tax is
easier to draft and administer than a tech-neutral subsidy.  Indeed, as
a practical matter, a tech-neutral subsidy is impossible.
1. The Advantages of Tech Neutrality
Before showing why tech neutrality is harder for subsidies, consider
why it matters.  Tech neutrality has two familiar advantages.
First, harms are abated more cost effectively.  When subsidies,
taxes, and permits are applied consistently, the government does not
favor some technologies or abatement methods over others.  As a re-
sult, heterogeneous individuals can choose the abatement method that
is most appealing to them.  In response to a national security tax on
oil, for instance, some can carpool or ride mass transit, while others
can opt for shorter commutes or fuel-efficient cars.  Firms can com-
pete to develop different options, such as hybrids, fuel-efficient gaso-
line engines, and vehicles that run on electricity or natural gas.  In
contrast, if the government omits some harms, choices become more
constrained, leading to inefficient or even counterproductive out-
comes.  For instance, a gas tax that applies to cars, but not SUVs,
would cause more consumers to drive (gas guzzling) SUVs.164  Gaps in
subsidies create parallel distortions.  For example, if the government
163 See, e.g., Sullivan, note 1, at 619; see also Gilbert Metcalf, Tax Policies for Low-
Carbon Technologies, 62 Nat’l Tax J. 519, 522-23 (2009).
164 By analogy, U.S. fuel economy standards do not reach sport utility vehicles and
minivans; this fact no doubt contributed to the increase in their market share from 3% in
1978 to 50% in 2003.  Soren T. Anderson, Ian W.H. Parry, James M. Sallee & Carolyn
Fischer, Automobile Fuel Economy Standards: Impacts, Efficiency, and Alternatives, 5
Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y 89, 94 (2011).
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subsidizes shorter commutes, but not mass transit, some who prefer
the bus will change their residence instead.
Tech-neutral subsidies and taxes also have a second advantage:  The
government sets the abatement process in motion, but does not have
to direct it.  Instead of targeting specific practices, the government can
rely on market judgments and competition.  This is a notable advan-
tage, since government officials often lack the information, expertise,
and incentives to evaluate competing abatement options, and are sub-
ject to interest group pressure in making these judgments.
2. Administrability Constraints on the Scope of Subsidies
A key goal for both taxes and subsidies, then, is to cover all the
relevant alternatives.  Taxes have to reach all sources of a problem.
Likewise, subsidies need to cover all solutions.  Although comparable
in principle, these efforts are quite different in practice:  Subsidies re-
quire more information and better calibrated rules.
To see the point, compare two ways of internalizing environmental
and national security externalities from gasoline, which are assumed
to be $X per gallon.  One is to impose a tax of $X on every gallon we
use.  The other is to offer a subsidy of $X for each gallon we conserve.
A neutral tax has to reach every gallon that is used.  Admittedly,
this is not a straightforward task.  For example, robust enforcement is
needed, so vendors actually collect the tax; otherwise, they may seek a
competitive advantage in charging customers a tax-free price.  Like-
wise, a tax has perverse effects if it covers only gasoline, but not alter-
natives that impose comparable environmental and national security
costs.  For example, if a tax reaches gasoline, but not jet fuel, some
people will fly instead of driving.165  To avoid these perverse effects,
the tax needs to be broadened to include diesel, propane, jet fuel,
plastics, and the like.  Covering all uses of oil is not easy, but we
should be able to come fairly close.
In contrast, a comparably comprehensive subsidy is simply not fea-
sible.  There are too many ways to reduce gasoline usage.  Reaching
them all—or even most of them—would require a monumental ad-
ministrative effort.  Specifically, the subsidy has to reach three types
of choices.
165 In general, air travel has the greatest climate impact per mile travelled, but the com-
parison to cars, buses, and trains depends on how full each of them is.  See generally Jens
Borken-Kleefeld, Jan Fuglestvedt & Terje Berntsen, Mode, Load, and Specific Climate
Impact from Passenger Trips, 47 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 7608 (2013) (comparing the specific
climate impact of long-distance car travel with bus, train, or airplane travel, accounting for
factors such as efficiency and occupancy).
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First, a tech-neutral subsidy has to cover every type of fuel-efficient
car.  It also has to reward other ways of enhancing fuel efficiency, such
as slow driving, properly inflated tires, and trips during less congested
hours.
Second, the subsidy also has to discourage driving.  To do so even-
handedly, it has to cover mass transit, bicycling, carpooling, moving
closer to work, telecommuting, forgoing discretionary trips, favoring
closer destinations over remote ones, and more.  For example, beach
vacations should be subsidized for those living near the beach, while
mountain vacations should be subsidized for those living near the
mountains.166
Third, the subsidy also has to reward us for reducing how much
others drive.  For instance, the government would cut checks for buy-
ing locally grown produce, hiring local service providers, socializing
with neighbors, and so on.
To be truly neutral, then, a subsidy has to be astonishingly compre-
hensive.  Detailed and complex rules are needed, along with an ex-
traordinary amount of taxpayer-specific information, as well as costly
and sophisticated monitoring mechanisms.  Put another way, although
a tax can simply be added to the price of energy, a subsidy has to
reward an almost infinite number of choices, which the government
has to identify and monitor.
Perhaps because the difference between taxes and subsidies derives
from administrative considerations—rather than from principle—the
literature has overlooked it.  Yet, this difference is quite significant.
As a practical matter, energy subsidies cannot be tech-neutral, but en-
ergy taxes and permits can—or, at least, they can come much closer.
Since the scope of energy subsidies has to be fine-tuned, they are
especially vulnerable to interest group pressure.  Not only do they dis-
pense money—a draw in and of itself—but they do so selectively, ben-
efitting some industries and firms more than others.  They also use
intricate criteria, which the general public is unlikely to understand or
monitor.  As prime targets for lobbying, these subsidies become all the
more prone to perverse effects.
3. Broadening Technology-Specific Subsidies
Not surprisingly, many green energy subsidies under current law do
not even try to reach all abatement options.  Instead, they place bets
on particular technologies.  For instance, to make cars more fuel-effi-
cient, Congress offers tax credits for specific types of cars, such as
166 I thank Louis Kaplow for this vivid example.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747610 
280 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:
plug-in electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles.167  In contrast, as Mar-
tin Sullivan has emphasized, there is no subsidy for making traditional
combustion engines more efficient, for instance, with diesel engines,
manual transmissions, turbocharging, or more aerodynamic designs.168
The narrowness of subsidies is a good reason to prefer taxes and
permits, as noted above.  But if Congress is stuck with subsidies for
political reasons, the subsidies should be broader.  For instance, Sulli-
van proposes a credit that rewards fuel efficiency however it is
achieved by offering a fixed dollar amount, such as $300, for each mpg
above twenty-five mpg.169
In a similar effort to avoid “picking winners,” Senator Max Baucus
has proposed to consolidate various tax credits for “clean” fuels (for
example, from alcohol, algae, feedstocks, and the like)170 into a single
tech-neutral credit:  “Any fuel that is about 25 percent cleaner than
conventional gasoline will generally receive a credit.  The cleaner . . .
the fuel, the larger the credit.  Cleanliness is defined as how clean a
given fuel production process is on a lifecycle emissions basis, as de-
termined by the EPA.”171  Like Sullivan’s suggestion for fuel-efficient
cars, this proposal defines a goal (reducing emissions and pollution
from transportation fuel) and offers a reward for achieving it, without
choosing which technology to use in pursuing it.  Baucus has offered a
similar proposal for clean electricity production as well.172
Compared with the green energy subsidies under current law, hy-
drocarbon subsidies usually are somewhat broader, and thus more
neutral.  For example, most do not focus on particular types of drill-
167 IRC §§ 30D, 30B(b).
168 Martin A. Sullivan, The Losers in the Energy Subsidy Game, 121 Tax Notes 510, 512-
15 (Nov. 3, 2008) (listing fifty ways to save gasoline that are not subsidized).
169 Id. at 510.  Although this proposal avoids the problem of “picking winners,” it does
not avoid another general problem with subsidizing fuel efficiency:  Since the fuel cost of
driving another mile is reduced, drivers drive these cars more.  For a discussion of this
“rebound” effect, see Subsection IV.C.1.
170 IRC § 40 (providing a credit for fuels from alcohol and qualified feedstock such as
algae), § 40A (credit for biodiesel and renewable diesel).
171 S. Fin. Comm., 113th Congress, Chairman’s Summary of Staff Discussion Draft; En-
ergy Tax Reform 5 (Comm. Print 2013), http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
121813%20Energy%20Tax%20Reform%20Discussion%20Draft%20Summary1.pdf [here-
inafter Chairman’s Discussion Draft].  The proposal also adjusts the credit for the energy
density of the fuel.  Id.
172 Id. at 3.  The proposal offers a credit based on the ratio of a producer’s emissions
over their energy production.  Id.  A flaw in this proposal is that producers can improve
their ratio, and thus earn a more generous credit, by producing renewable energy that no
one needs, and paying customers to take it.  This problem already arises with the produc-
tion tax credit, discussed below.  See Subsection IV.C.2.
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ing,173 and are available to all hydrocarbon producers.174  Neverthe-
less, nearly all are too narrow in applying only to U.S. production,
even though production in other secure and friendly nations also can
enhance national security, as noted above.175
4. Geographical Scope
A somewhat related challenge in setting the scope of subsidies—
and of taxes and permits as well—is that they apply in some countries,
but not others.  For example, assume Country A either taxes coal, or
subsidizes substitutes for it, while Country B does not.  Although de-
mand for coal in Country A will decline, there are two offsetting ef-
fects.  First, coal prices should fall, inducing Country B to use more
coal.  Second, when selling goods made with coal, such as steel—both
in Country A and in other markets—firms in Country B have a com-
parative advantage.176  In response, firms in Country A may move
production to Country B.  Without multilateral coordination, then,
Country A’s policy could end up merely shifting the consumption of
coal to other countries, instead of reducing it.
To mitigate this problem, countries can make contingent commit-
ments, which take effect only if other countries match them.  Or they
can proceed unilaterally, using the credibility they gain in doing so to
urge others to follow.177
B. Overall Demand for Energy
In addition to their inability to reach all the relevant substitutes,
subsidies have another disadvantage, which features prominently in
the literature:  Unlike taxes and permits, subsidies do not raise energy
prices, and thus do not depress overall demand for energy.
To see the difference, assume gasoline costs $2.50, and an energy-
equivalent amount of ethanol costs $3.  Ethanol becomes competitive
173 Three subsidies focus on particular types of production—the credits for marginal
wells, enhanced oil recovery, and unconventional sources, IRC §§ 45I, 43, 45K—but they
are not currently in effect, since they can be claimed only when prices are sufficiently low.
174 Percentage depletion generally is available only for “independent” producers.  IRC
§ 613A(c).
175 See Subsection II.C.3.
176 Goulder & Parry, note 5, at 170.  To blunt this effect, Country A can try to extend its
coal tax to these imported goods.  Determining the influence of coal on their price is diffi-
cult, however, and trade rules further complicate this effort.
177 Energy Strategy, note 40, at 39-40 (“While some might suggest that the growing in-
ternational share of GHG emissions means that U.S. reductions are too small to matter, in
fact the opposite is true. . . .  [B]y taking strong steps to reduce emissions at home, . . . the
Administration is in a much stronger position to secure similar commitments from other
nations.”).
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if either the price of gasoline is increased (with a 50 cent tax or permit
price) or the price of ethanol is reduced (with a 50 cent subsidy).  Al-
though these alternatives have the same effect on relative price (that
is, whether gasoline is cheaper than ethanol), they have different ef-
fects on the absolute price (that is, whether fuel costs $2.50 or $3.00).
Since fuel prices are higher with the tax (or permit) than the subsidy,
consumers are motivated to use less fuel.  As Metcalf has observed,
“consumers shift away from consuming energy to consuming other
goods.”178
There also is another reason why subsidies, but not taxes, might in-
crease the demand for energy: subsidies for conservation may be
harder to administer, and thus less common, than subsidies for new
sources of energy.  For example, the purchase of an electric car is eas-
ier for the government to observe – and thus to subsidize – than the
choice to skip errands or to vacation near home.  If this theory is cor-
rect—so subsidies for conservation actually are less common—this
bias could increase the overall demand for energy.
In contrast, gas and carbon taxes should be immune from this bias.
They ask only how many gallons we buy, and requires no information
about what we do (or do not do) to use less.179  As a result, a gas tax is
equally able to reward new sources of energy, on one hand, and con-
servation, on the other.
C. Targeting Results Instead of Proxies
While some subsidies under current law are too narrow, as the last
two Sections have shown, other subsidies suffer from a different limi-
tation:  They reward the wrong behavior.  Specifically, gaps can
emerge between the policy goal, on one hand, and the behavior that is
rewarded, on the other.
1. Energy Efficiency and Rebound
A familiar example is “rebound,” which is a perverse effect of subsi-
dizing energy-efficient cars and appliances:  Consumers end up using
178 Metcalf, note 163, at 524.  In addition to these substitution effects, taxes and subsi-
dies also can have income effects.  For instance, by raising the price of fuel, a gas tax
reduces a consumer’s purchasing power.  Likewise, by lowering the price of fuel, an ethanol
subsidy increases purchasing power.  Yet to assess the income effects of taxes and subsidies,
we also need to know how the tax revenue is spent, and how the subsidy is funded.  For
instance, if a gas tax funds a cut in another tax (such as the income tax), the gas tax and the
income tax cut have competing effects on purchasing power.  The net of these effects deter-
mines the overall income effect.
179 I am grateful to Louis Kaplow for this observation.
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them more, so less energy is saved.180  For instance, consider two op-
tions for internalizing the negative externalities of oil, which are as-
sumed to be $1 per gallon:  a gasoline tax of $1 per gallon181 or a tax
credit of $265 per year for fuel-efficient “plug-in” hybrid vehicles.182
Both encourage drivers to buy plug-in hybrids.  The credit does so
directly, while the gas tax does so indirectly by discouraging the use of
gasoline.  Nevertheless, the gas tax is likely to be more effective at
reducing gasoline usage.  The difference is that the tax increases the
cost of using another gallon, while the hybrid credit does not.  On the
contrary, the credit actually lowers the marginal cost of driving by re-
ducing the gasoline used per mile, thus creating an incentive to drive
more miles.
The problem with this hybrid credit—and, more generally, with sub-
sidies for energy efficiency—is that they do not reward the actual be-
havior we want (using less energy), but behavior that is related but
different (using fuel-efficient technology).  Buying a hybrid is merely a
proxy for using less gasoline.  A proxy could be tempting if it is more
administrable, more politically palatable, or more salient.  Yet target-
ing a proxy, instead of the behavior we actually want, can produce
flawed incentives.183
180 Metcalf, note 178, at 524 (discussing rebound); see also Energy Efficiency and Sus-
tainable Consumption 2-10 (Horace Herring & Steve Sorrell eds., 2008).  Empirical evi-
dence suggests that consumers do, in fact, react in this way.  See, e.g., Anderson et al., note
164, at 93 (rebound estimated at about 10% of fuel savings from the Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) program).
181 A tradeable permit costing $1 would have the same effect.
182 While a “regular” hybrid uses electricity at low speeds and shifts to gasoline at higher
speeds, “plug-in” hybrids use electricity at all speeds, but use some gasoline to generate
electricity.  Alternative Fuels Data Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Hybrid and Plug-In Electric
Vehicles, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/vehicles/electric.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2016); Plug-
in Hybrids, Fueleconomy.gov, https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/phevtech.shtml (last vis-
ited Nov. 21, 2016).  While there is a tax credit for plug-in hybrids under current law, it
generally is $2500 to $7500 per vehicle, depending on the size of the battery.  IRC § 30D.
The $265 per year in the example here is hypothetical, but it is used to establish (seeming)
parity with a $1 per gallon gas tax.  Specifically, if a 2013 hybrid’s gas mileage is 42 miles
per gallon (mpg), compared with 23 mpg for the average vehicle, then if a hybrid drives the
average number of miles in a year (13,476), it uses 265 gallons less per year.  U.S. Dep’t of
Energy, Model Year 2013 Fuel Economy Guide 29-30 (2016) http://www.fueleconomy.gov/
feg/pdfs/guides/FEG2013.pdf [hereinafter 2013 Fuel Economy Guide]; Average Annual
Miles Per Driver by Age Group, Fed. Highway Admin., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/
onh00/bar8.htm (last modified July 13, 2016).  Since the negative externalities are assumed
to be $1 per gallon, the tax credit is $265 per year.
183 See Don Fullerton, Inkee Hong & Gilbert E. Metcalf, A Tax on Output of the Pollut-
ing Industry Is Not a Tax on Pollution:  The Importance of Hitting the Target, in Behav-
ioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy 13-15 (Carol Carraro & Gilbert E.
Metcalf eds., 2001) (considering welfare costs of imperfectly-targeted environmental in-
struments); Goulder & Parry, note 5, at 157 (“Still another pricing instrument is a tax on an
input, produced goods, or service associated with emissions. . . . However, because these
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The point of this example is that “results-based” policies are more
promising than proxy policies.184  The successful example (the gas tax)
is more results-based, since it encourages the desired behavior (using
less gasoline) instead of conduct that may correlate with this behavior
(buying a hybrid).185
Even so, if we are stuck with an imperfect proxy, one way to im-
prove it is to add more conditions.  For example, a hybrid credit
reduces gasoline consumption more effectively if another requirement
is added:  To be eligible, claimants must have mileage-based auto in-
surance, so they pay higher premiums for driving more.  In effect, the
task of discouraging rebound is delegated to an insurance company.
Admittedly, instead of a results-based condition, which focuses on
gasoline usage, the subsidy now uses two proxy conditions:  one favor-
ing fuel-efficient cars, and the other constraining how much these cars
are driven.  Yet the combination of these conditions targets the goal
better than either can alone.
2. Production Incentives and Negative Pricing
A less familiar example of a proxy subsidy, which also creates per-
verse incentives, is the production tax credit.186  It rewards firms for
producing electricity from renewable sources.  While other subsidies
are available for investing in wind farms, this subsidy, which is tied to
producing electricity, leads firms to produce more electricity, as a re-
cent study shows.187  Although the study implies that this greater pro-
ductivity is beneficial,188 the reality is more complicated.
taxes do not focus sharply on the externality, they do not engage all of the pollution reduc-
tion channels described above, implying a loss of cost-effectiveness.”).
184 This is true not only when we subsidize a proxy, but also when we tax it (or require a
permit for it).  For example, assume we impose an annual tax on owners of SUVs to reduce
oil consumption.  Although SUVs obviously are gas guzzlers, this “product tax” uses an
imperfect proxy (the SUV itself), instead of the behavior we want to discourage (use of
gasoline).  This SUV tax is both too broad (in applying to all SUVs, regardless of how
many miles they travel) and too narrow (in excluding gas-guzzling sedans).
185 Admittedly, a gasoline tax is also a proxy, since the problem it targets is not the use
of gasoline per se, but the environmental harm from extracting and burning it, and the
national security cost of policing access and enriching rivals.  But although a gas tax is also
a proxy, it is a better proxy than the hybrid credit.
186 IRC § 45.
187 Joseph E. Aldy, Todd D. Gerarden & Richard L. Sweeney, Capital Versus Output
Subsidies:  Implications of Alternative Incentives for Wind Energy 1 (Sept. 2016) (unpub-
lished manuscript), http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/cas_sites/economics/pdf/
Seminars/SemF2016/AGS_Capital_v_Output_Subsidies_Paper_HKS.pdf (finding that
wind farm developers choosing an upfront investment subsidy produce 5-12% less electric-
ity than wind farms selecting an output subsidy).
188 Id. at 23. (noting that the “rationale behind wind subsidies is to displace conven-
tional, polluting generation with zero-emissions electricity”).
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Unfortunately, the credit is available even if the wind electricity is not
needed, and thus does not actually replace hydrocarbons.189
Specifically, § 45 offers a credit of 2.3 cents for each kWh of elec-
tricity generated with wind and sold to unrelated third parties.  Gener-
ating electricity from wind is easier at night, but there also is less
demand,190 and electricity generally cannot be stored.  Moreover,
some windy locations are remote, and do not have transmission lines
to send electricity where there is more demand.191  This means firms
have ample opportunities to generate electricity that is not needed.192
To collect the credit, they pay customers to take this excess power—a
practice known as “negative pricing”193—and also pay the grid to ab-
sorb it.
Hopefully, negative pricing can induce at least some changes in con-
sumption patterns; for instance, some dishwashers may be run at
night.194  In addition, technology should ameliorate this problem over
time.  For example, new transmission lines in West Texas have re-
duced the frequency of negative pricing by shipping excess capacity to
Dallas, Houston, and Austin.195  In addition, improvements in battery
189 Richard Schmalensee, The Performance of U.S. Wind and Solar Generators, 37 En-
ergy J. 123, 144-45 (2016) (“Encouraging renewable generation when its marginal value to
the electric grid is negative obviously raises costs to society, but that is what both the
federal PTC and state RPS programs do . . . .”).
190 Id. at 15, 18.
191 Id. at 16 (noting that negative pricing often derives from transmission congestion).
192 Id. at 32 (empirical finding that “when spot prices are negative and they can gener-
ate, wind and solar plants generally do so”); id. at 17 (noting that “on average wind facili-
ties outside [New England] had positive outputs during 92% of hours during which the
spot price they faced was negative,” and that “wind plants produced 49% more on average
during those hours than at other times”).  This problem is more severe for wind than solar.
As a result, Richard Schmalensee has concluded that output from solar is 32% more valua-
ble than output from wind, since solar does not produce at night when demand is low.  Id.
at 12, 15.
193 Frank Huntowski, Aaron Patterson & Michael Schnitzer, The NorthBridge Grp.,
Negative Electricity Prices and the Production Tax Credit:  Why Wind Producers Can Pay
Us to Take Their Power—And Why That Is a Bad Thing 2 (2012), http://www.northbridge-
group.com/publications/Negative_Electricity_Prices_and_the_Production_Tax_Credit.pdf.
Empirical evidence suggests that wind generation is usually the cause of negative pricing.
For example, negative pricing is much more frequent in hours when wind generates a
larger percentage of a region’s electricity.  Id. at 5-6.  In West Texas in 2011, for instance,
there was negative pricing in over 70% of the hours when wind was generating at least
25% of the region’s electricity.  Id. at 12 fig.8 (“[N]egative prices are most prevalent when
wind output is highest relative to overall demand, such as during the overnight hours in the
spring and fall months when wind output is high but demand is relatively low and less
power is needed.”).
194 Clifford Krauss & Diane Cardwell, A Texas Utility Offers a Nighttime Special:  Free
Electricity, N.Y. Times (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/business/en-
ergy-environment/a-texas-utility-offers-a-nighttime-special-free-electricity.html.
195 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Fewer Wind Curtailments and Negative Power Prices
Seen in Texas After Major Grid Expansion, (June 27, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=16831.
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and storage technologies would help as well;196 indeed, one advantage
of electric vehicles is that their batteries can store electricity generated
at night.
Nevertheless, the root of this problem is that the production tax
credit uses a flawed proxy—producing renewable energy, instead of
replacing carbon-based energy.197  One way to solve this problem is
for the credit to reward revenue or profit, instead of production.  This
way, the government can piggyback on consumer judgments about the
energy’s value.198  If consumers will not pay for it, the government
should not subsidize it.  Alternatively, if these regimes continue to fo-
cus on production, we should add another condition:  To be eligible
for the credit, electricity has to sell for at least a minimum (positive)
price.
D. Heterogeneous Harms
One reason why targeting the right behavior is essential is that the
size of subsidies and taxes is supposed is depend on how harmful this
behavior is. But this fine-tuning is hard for three reasons, which are
more daunting for subsidies than for taxes.
First, seemingly identical activities can generate different harms.
For example, the GHG’s emitted from an electric car – and thus, the
social benefit from using one – depend on whether the electricity is
generated from coal or wind.199  So in setting the subsidy for electric
cars, should we assume the electricity is generated with coal or wind?
This problem does not arise with a carbon tax, since no such assump-
tion is needed.  Instead, the tax increases the price of electricity from
196 Bill Tucker, Promises, Promises . . . and Energy Storage, Forbes: Commodities &
Currencies (Mar. 18, 2015, 4:56 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/billtucker/2015/03/18/
promises-promises-and-energy-storage/#31f4ebbb62c2 (noting that the energy storage in-
dustry expects to grow by 250% and that improvements would allow electricity from peak
generation periods to be used after the sun has set or the wind has stopped blowing).
197 This is not to say that negative pricing arises only from the production tax credit or
other poorly targeted subsidies.  In some cases, negative pricing can arise (temporarily)
when power is generated in ways that cannot be quickly ramped down, triggering excess
supply.  I thank Felix Mormann for this observation.
198 Schmalensee, note 189, at 145 (“In regions with organized wholesale markets, it
would provide superior incentives to pay output subsidies only when the spot price is posi-
tive or even to pay them on top of (or even make them proportional to) the spot price
. . . .”)
199 Cohen et al., note 7, at 77-78; Joshua S. Graff-Zivin, Matthew J. Kotchen & Erin T.
Mansur, Spatial and Temporal Heterogeneity of Marginal Emissions:  Implications for
Electric Cars and Other Electricity-Shifting Policies, 107 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 248, 263-
64 (2014).  The authors compare marginal CO2 emission rates from electric cars with those
of hybrid vehicles and traditional gasoline-powered cars.  They find that the environmental
benefit of driving an electric vehicle is dependent on the “substantial geographic and tem-
poral variation in the emission rates of power plants” nationwide.  Id. at 263.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747610 
2017] ENERGY SUBSIDIES 287
coal, but not from wind.  Therefore, consumers can account for cli-
mate costs in deciding whether to buy an electric car, and how much
to drive it.
Second, assessments of harms have to account for the full “life cy-
cle” of an activity.  For instance, the carbon footprint of an electric
vehicle includes not only the electricity to drive it, but also the GHGs
to manufacture it.  In fact, more GHGs are emitted in manufacturing
electric vehicles—and, in particular, their batteries—than gasoline-
powered cars.200  A subsidy that omits these costs is mispriced.  But
once again, a carbon tax avoids this problem.  A tax forces producers
of electric cars to internalize these “upstream” climate costs, so they
are incorporated in the price of these goods.
Third, and relatedly, although taxes (and permits) are based on the
harm a targeted activity causes, subsidies are based on the harm it
avoids.  Yet avoided harms are especially hard to measure because, by
definition, they never happen.  For example, a wind turbine avoids
more emissions in replacing coal than natural gas.201  Identifying
which plant is decommissioned is not easy, while identifying which is
never built is impossible.202  Therefore, to determine how much a sub-
sidy improves a situation—an inquiry known as “additionality”—we
need to know what would happen without it,203 but this baseline is not
always clear.
200 Nat’l Research Council, Hidden Costs, note 3, at 203-04 (“Damages from the emis-
sions associated with vehicle manufacture account for a large percentage of the overall life-
cycle damages.  Thus, even with the large decreases in emissions from generating electricity
at fossil-fueled plants, the large damages from the vehicle-manufacture component mean
that life-cycle damages for electric vehicles would probably be somewhat greater than
those for conventional vehicles, unless there is significant reduction in energy use in manu-
facturing batteries and other electric vehicle components.”); Joshua Linn & Virginia Mc-
Connell, How Electric Cars Can Increase Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 184 Resources 33,
35-37 (2013), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Resources-
184_Feature-LinnMcConnell.pdf.
201 David Weisbach, Designing Subsidies for Low-Carbon Energy, 20 J. Envtl. & Sus-
tainability L. 1, 14 (2013); see Joseph Cullen, Measuring the Environmental Benefit of
Wind-Generated Electricity, Am. Econ. J., Nov. 2013, at 107, 108 (“[T]he quantity of emis-
sions offset by wind power will depend crucially on which generators reduce their
output.”).
202 The best the government can do is to make assumptions based on general trends (for
example, geothermal tends to replace coal while wind tends to replace natural gas), but
these assumptions are not always accurate.  Metcalf, note 3, at 169.
203 Michael Gillenwater, What Is Additionality?  Part One:  A Longstanding Problem 3
(Greenhouse Gas Mgmt. Inst., Discussion Paper No. 001, 2012), http://ghginstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/AdditionalityPaper_Part-1ver3FINAL.pdf (“Conceptually, addi-
tionality is a determination of whether a proposed activity will produce some ‘extra good’
in the future relative to a reference scenario, which we refer to as a baseline.”).
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E. Coordination of Different Policy Instruments
A further challenge with targeted subsidies—and, indeed, also
other narrowly tailored instruments—is that they tend to be used in
combination, and thus need to be coordinated.
One reason to use more than one instrument is that if one fails, the
other can still advance the relevant policy goal.  But built-in redun-
dancy works only if gaps in the two instruments are different.  Other-
wise, they are likely to fail at the same time.204
This problem arises with two instruments currently used to promote
fuel efficiency: subsidies for specific types of cars, as discussed above,
and fuel efficiency standards (i.e., the so-called “Corporate Average
Fuel Economy” or “CAFE” standards).
Unfortunately, subsidies and CAFE share two limitations.  First, as
noted above, subsidies reward some ways of enhancing fuel efficiency,
but not others (such as electric motors, but not light frames). In prin-
ciple, CAFE should avoid this problem: Instead of a minimum stan-
dard for each car, CAFE sets a minimum average for all cars sold by a
particular manufacturer.205  As a result, while CAFE requires manu-
facturers to sell enough cars with above-average fuel efficiency (to bal-
ance those it sells with below-average efficiency), CAFE should be
able to do so, at least in principle, without telling the manufacturer
how to make cars more fuel-efficient.  But unfortunately, the new
CAFE standards for 2017–2021 stray from this tech neutral path.
They favor electric vehicles by giving them double weighting in the
CAFE average.206  As a result, CAFE reinforces the bias for electric
cars that already is present in subsidies under current law.207
Second, subsidies for fuel-efficient cars and CAFE share another
limitation as well.  In seeking to reduce the use of petroleum, these
policies influence only one relevant choice (which car to purchase),
but not another (how much to drive it).208
In contrast, a gas tax does not share these limitations, since it re-
wards consumers for using less gasoline, without favoring one conser-
vation method over another.  As a result, a gas tax would be a better
204 David M. Schizer, Between Scylla and Charybdis:  Taxing Corporations or Share-
holders (or Both), 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1849 (2016).
205 There are actually two sets of CAFE requirements.  The National Highway Transpor-
tation Safety Administration promulgates one on fuel economy, while the Environmental
Protection Agency promulgates another based on GHGs.  Anderson et al., note 162, at 90-
91.
206 Federal Vehicle Standards:  Calculating Light-Duty Vehicle CAFE Then and Now,
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.c2es.org/federal/ex-
ecutive/vehicle-standards#calculating.
207 See Subsection IV.A.3.
208 See Subsection IV.C.1.
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backstop for either of these policies, if more than one instrument is
desired.
F. Scarcity Rents
Even if these other problems are solved, subsidies still would pose a
further challenge:  If they succeed in launching viable substitutes for
disfavored energy—or are expected to succeed in the future—produc-
ers of this disfavored energy are likely to respond by cutting prices.  In
effect, they would sell this energy while they still can.209  As William
Hotelling observed, producers of finite resources always face the
choice of either tapping their reserve today or saving it for sale to-
morrow.210  Therefore, prices today reflect expectations about prices
tomorrow.211  If producers expect an energy innovation (such as shale
gas or renewables) to replace a product (like coal) in the future, they
cut prices today, unloading the reserve while they still can get some-
thing for it.
Therefore, energy subsidies can have a perverse effect:  By promot-
ing green alternatives for the future, they can make fossil fuels harder
to displace today.  The more promising this alternative is, the more
motivated producers are to cut prices.  These price cuts are likely to
induce consumers to use more energy.212  As a result, the new source
of energy can end up supplementing fossil fuels, instead of replacing
them.
To an extent, taxes and permits also can trigger this unintended ef-
fect.  By making hydrocarbons less competitive, taxes and permits en-
courage investments in alternative energy, which can inspire fossil fuel
producers to cut prices.  Yet this problem should be less severe, since
taxes and permits increase the price of hydrocarbons, offsetting these
“Hotelling” cuts, at least in part.213
209 While this dynamic can arise in any market—just as grocery stores discount day-old
produce—the effect is especially powerful in extractive industries.
210 Hotelling, note 31, at 137-40.
211 In addition to marginal production costs, prices include “scarcity rents,” which reflect
how scarce supply is compared with expected demand.  Indeed, the prices should be the
same, except that the price tomorrow is increased for time value (since producers must
wait to be paid).  See generally Heal, note 32 (exploring the economics of resource alloca-
tion in the context of exhaustible resources).
212 Michael Hoel, Bush Meets Hotelling:  Effects of Renewable Energy Technology on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions 4 (CESifo Grp., Working Paper No. 2492, 2008), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1314688 (“[F]ossil fuels are non-renewable, and
the competitive supply gives a price path of the fuel which depends both on present and
future demand. When this ‘Hotelling feature’ is taken into consideration, the whole price
path of the carbon resource will shift downwards as a response to the reduced cost of the
substitute.”).
213 Even so, taxes (and permits) can be especially counterproductive if phased in over
time.  If fossil fuel producers expect tax and permit costs to rise in the future, they sell
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V. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN CHALLENGES:  TRADITIONAL
TAX POLICY CONCERNS
Part IV analyzed institutional design challenges with targeted subsi-
dies.  This Part adds three additional considerations, which are
grounded in traditional tax policy concerns.  Congress should keep
them in mind, but in general they do not create a strong basis to favor
taxes over subsidies, or vice versa.  First, both energy taxes and subsi-
dies can distort labor and savings decisions; second, energy subsidies
are a flawed vehicle for pursuing distributional goals;214 and third, the
tax system has familiar limitations in pursuing environmental and na-
tional security goals.
A. Labor and Savings Distortions
At first blush, a potential disadvantage of subsidies is that they con-
sume revenue, while Pigouvian taxes and some tradeable permits raise
revenue.215  By this logic, taxes and permits seem to offer a “double
dividend.”  In addition to correcting an externality (the first dividend),
they can replace other distortive taxes, easing labor and savings distor-
tions (the second dividend).
But this apparent advantage is illusory.216  After all, carbon and gas-
oline taxes are not distortion-free.  Like other taxes, they also affect
labor and savings choices.  By increasing the after-tax cost of goods
and services, these taxes erode the purchasing power of additional
earnings, and thus can distort labor and savings choices.
Even so, carbon and gasoline taxes are likely to cause milder labor
and savings distortions than a progressive income tax.  The reason is
that they are less redistributive, since high-income households devote
a lower percentage of their income to gasoline (and gasoline taxes).
Because gas and carbon taxes become less burdensome as taxpayers
earn more, they are less likely to discourage work and saving.  Obvi-
ously, the opposite is true of a progressive income tax, which (by defi-
more now.  See Hans Werner Sinn, Public Policies Against Global Warming:  A Supply
Side Approach, 15 Int’l Tax Pub. Fin. 360, 380 (2008) (defining the “green paradox” as the
possibility that resource owners will accelerate extraction to make “the price path suffi-
ciently steep to compensate for the rising tax rate”).
214 In other work, I have distinguished between the effect of tax expenditures on
“programmatic benefits”—that is, the positive and negative externalities they create—and
their effect on excess burden and distribution.  See generally David M. Schizer, Limiting
Tax Expenditures, 68 Tax L. Rev. 275 (2015) (offering strategies for limiting tax expendi-
tures, focusing in part on programmatic benefit, excess burden, and distribution).
215 Permit regimes can raise revenue if permits are auctioned, instead of given away for
free.
216 Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend
Hypothesis:  Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 221,
222 (1998) (discussing the validity of the double-dividend hypothesis).
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nition) becomes more burdensome as taxpayers earn more.  As a
result, replacing a progressive income tax with a regressive gas or car-
bon tax makes the system less redistributive, and thus can ease labor
and savings distortions.
But to be precise, this easing of distortions derives from reducing
redistribution, not from changing the tax base (i.e., from income to
gas).  Congress can get a similar result by keeping the income tax, but
making rates less progressive.  After all, if an income tax and a gas tax
collect the same tax on an additional dollar of income, they should
cause the same labor and savings distortions.217
As a result, using a carbon or gas tax does not commit us to a spe-
cific level of redistribution (or labor and savings effects).  Congress
can attain the level of redistribution it wants by pairing these taxes
with other adjustments to the tax system.  For example, a regressive
carbon tax could be bundled with more progressive income tax
rates.218
The same is true of energy subsidies.  They can encourage work and
saving by reducing the cost of energy, and thus increasing the purchas-
ing power of marginal earnings.  But the taxes funding this subsidy can
have the opposite effect.  If the overall package has the same impact
on distribution as one introducing an energy tax, the two reforms
should affect labor and savings choices the same way.
To illustrate this point, the following examples pair an income tax
with an energy tax in one case, and with an energy subsidy in the
other.  This example shows that either package can generate the same
effective marginal rate, and thus the same effect on labor and savings
choices and distribution.
Assume an average taxpayer would ordinarily spend 9% of her
marginal earnings on energy, but a subsidy would increase this level to
10%, while a Pigouvian tax would reduce it to 8%.219  As Table 1
shows, this average taxpayer has the same 18% effective marginal rate
under each of the following three regimes:  first, an 18% income tax;
second, a 16% income tax paired with a 25% tax on (disfavored) en-
ergy purchases; and third, a 20% income tax with a deduction (and
thus a subsidy) for (favored) energy purchases:
217 Of course, other sources of deadweight loss could be different, such as the costs of
drafting and enforcing tax rules and of complying (and planning around) them.
218 Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation,
53 Int’l Econ. Rev. 487, 488 (2012) (“when reforms are implemented in this distribution-
neutral manner, labor supply is unaffected . . . .”).
219 In this stylized example, the taxpayer buys hydrocarbons if there is no tax or subsidy.
If a Pigouvian tax is imposed on hydrocarbons, she continues to buy them but reduces her
consumption.  If a subsidy for green energy is enacted instead, she switches to green energy
and increases her energy spending.
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TABLE 1
TAX ON AN ADDITIONAL $100 OF EARNINGS
25% Income
Energy Energy Energy Taxable Tax Income Total
Regime Purchased Tax Deduction Income Rate Tax Tax
18% Income Tax $9 $0 $0 $100 18% $18 $18
16% Income Tax 8 2 0 100 16% 16 18
with 25%
Energy Tax
20% Income Tax 10 0 10 90 20% 18 18
with Deduction
for Energy
The energy tax keeps the effective rate at 18%—and thus does not
change labor and savings distortions—because it has two offsetting ef-
fects.  On one hand, it funds a cut in the marginal income tax rate
from 18% to 16% (easing distortions).  On the other hand, it increases
the cost of (disfavored) energy, and thus erodes the purchasing power
of marginal earnings (exacerbating distortions).220  For the average
taxpayer, the energy tax functions like a 2% tax on marginal earnings,
which reverses the 2% cut in the income tax.221
Similarly, the energy subsidy also has two offsetting effects, which
keep the effective rate at 18% (and thus cause the same labor and
savings distortions).  On one hand, the stated income tax rate is in-
creased (from 18% to 20%) to fund this subsidy (exacerbating distor-
tions).  On the other hand, the deductibility of (favored) energy
enhances the purchasing power of marginal earnings (easing distor-
tions).  For the average taxpayer, this energy subsidy functions as a
2% marginal rate cut, reversing the 2% income tax increase.
Notably, these effects offset perfectly—instead of partially—only
for those who buy the average amount of energy.  Those who buy less
come out ahead when an energy tax funds an income tax cut.  Because
they buy so little energy, their energy tax bill is less than their income
tax savings.  The opposite is true of a heavy user of energy, since their
energy tax bill exceeds their income tax savings.  In other words, al-
though distribution-neutral reforms should not affect labor distortions
on average, they could do so for particular individuals.  Again, energy
taxes and subsidies are the same in this way.
220 Lawrence H. Goulder, Climate Change Policy’s Interactions with the Tax System, 40
Energy Econ. S3, S4 (2013).
221 In the literature, the first is called a tax interaction effect, and the second is called a
revenue recycling effect.  Id.
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B. Distribution
Another potential concern about energy subsidies is that high-in-
come claimants are more likely to claim them.  According to Severin
Borenstein and Lucas Davis, households in the top 20% of the income
distribution have claimed 60% of the clean energy credits under cur-
rent law, while households in the bottom 60% have claimed only
10%.222  As a result, commentators express concern about the distri-
butional impact of these programs, and some credits have been
amended to exclude high-income households.223
However, the fact that these subsidies are claimed disproportion-
ately by high-income claimants is not surprising.  Targeting them actu-
ally makes sense when two conditions are satisfied.
First, the favored technology involves added (private) costs, which
are daunting to low-  and middle-income households.  For example,
hybrid and electric vehicles have significantly higher purchase prices
than conventional cars.224  As a result, low-  and middle-income
households are likely to choose cheaper alternatives (conventional
cars), which offer comparable private benefits (transportation) with-
out the relevant externalities (reduced GHGs and gasoline consump-
tion).225  If a hybrid costs $15,000 more than a traditional car, low-
and middle-income households are unlikely to buy one unless the sub-
sidy is almost $15,000.  In contrast, a high-income household can be
motivated with less.  If a $5000 subsidy is enough, Congress puts three
times as many hybrids on the road for the same money by making
high-income claimants eligible for the subsidy.226
In addition, whether the driver of a hybrid has a high or low in-
come, the positive externalities are the same.  Either way, GHGs and
gasoline usage are reduced.  This raises a second reason to subsidize
high-income claimants, which is somewhat unique to energy subsidies:
The social benefit is comparable, whether the subsidy is claimed by
someone with a high or low income.  In subsidizing the hybrid, the
222 Severin Borenstein & Lucas Davis, The Distributional Effects of U.S. Clean Energy
Tax Credits, 30 Tax Pol’y & Econ. 191, 191 (2016).
223 For example, regulators in California recently excluded high-income households
from state subsidies for electric vehicles.  Patrick McGreevy, California Limits Hybrid Re-
bates to Households Earning Less Than $500,000, L.A. Times (Aug. 23, 2015), http://www
.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-electric-cars-20150824-story.html.
224 The Real Cost of Owning a Hybrid:  Do Fuel Savings Offset a Higher Price?, Ed-
munds.com (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.edmunds.com/fuel-economy/the-real-costs-of-own-
ing-a-hybrid.html.
225 Hunt Allcott, Christopher Knittel & Dmitry Taubinsky, Tagging and Targeting of
Energy Efficient Subsidies, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 187, 190 (2015) (empirical analysis show-
ing that subsidies for energy-efficient durable goods, such as air conditioners and cars
“preferentially accrue to wealthier consumers”).
226 The assumption here is that hybrids reduce GHGs and petroleum consumption, not
withstanding rebound.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2747610 
294 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:
objective is not to offer private benefits to the driver (for example, by
helping her to afford a car), but to generate environmental and na-
tional security benefits for everyone.  This is an important difference
from subsidies for retirement savings and healthcare, for instance,
where private benefits for the claimant are a more significant motiva-
tion.  For the same reason, it is unsatisfying to measure the distribu-
tional impact of these energy subsidies by asking who claims them,
instead of who benefits when the targeted harms are abated.227
Unfortunately, Congress still includes distributional criteria in some
energy subsidies.  For example, the Department of Energy spent bil-
lions on “weatherizing” the residences of seven million low-income
Americans.228  Focusing on low-income claimants, however, is not
cost-effective, as noted above, because the government presumably
has to cover a higher percentage of weatherization costs.  Not surpris-
ingly, a recent study determined that this program had a negative
return.229
Another problem with using an energy subsidy to pursue distribu-
tional goals is that it is unlikely to be a cost-effective way to help low-
income households.  If the goal is to channel resources to them, an
energy subsidy is less efficient than cash, since it can be used only for a
designated purpose.230
Therefore, energy goals generally should be pursued as cost effec-
tively as possible, without regard to distribution.  Some of the savings
can then be allocated to programs that pursue distributional goals effi-
ciently, such as payroll tax cuts or increases in the earned income tax
credit.231
227 Cf. Schizer, note 214, at 278 (arguing that the people who claim a tax expenditure are
not necessarily those who benefit from the positive externalities it creates).
228 Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, U.S. Dept. of Energy, About the
Weatherization Assistance Program, http://energy.gov/eere/wipo/about-weatherization-as-
sistance-program-0 (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).  This program’s annual budget increased
from $450 million per year in 2009 to $5 billion in 2011 and 2012.  See Energy Conservation
and Production Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6861 (2012) (authorizing federal support and technical
assistance for the weatherization program); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 105, 123 Stat. 115, 138 (2009) (providing for increase in budget of
weatherization program); see also Fred Sissine, Cong. Research Serv., R42147, DOE
Weatherization Program:  A Review of Funding, Performance, and Cost-Effectiveness
Studies 9 n.32 (2012) (stating that the Obama Administration provided the weatherization
program budget a one-time increase to $5 billion, “a major increase over the $450 million
appropriated for the program in FY2009”).
229 The private return over a twenty-year time span was 1.5%, while the social return,
which includes reducing GHGs, was -6.1%.  Fowlie et. al., note 39, at 31-33, 49 tbl.7.
230 For instance, instead of $1000 to weatherize their home, a low-income household
would prefer a payroll tax refund of $1000 (or even $800), which can be used for any
purpose.
231 As a stylized example, assume a $200 weatherization grant to a high-income claimant
has the same environmental benefit as a $1000 weatherization grant to a (less responsive)
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Even so, favoring low-income claimants still makes sense in three
circumstances.  First, some market failures, such as credit constraints,
disproportionately affect them.232  For instance, if weatherization pays
for itself over time in reduced energy bills, a subsidy is needed only
for those who cannot fund the up-front investment.  In this case, fo-
cusing on low-income households actually is the most cost-effective
response.  Second, if subsidies are provided through tax deductions or
nonrefundable credits, which are less valuable to low-income claim-
ants, a separate program may be needed for them.  Third, if separate
distributional adjustments (such as the $800 in the example above) are
not politically feasible, there is more reason to account for distribution
within the energy program itself.
C. Tax as a Leaky Mechanism for Delivering Subsidies
Finally, two other familiar challenges arise when the tax system is
used to deliver energy subsidies.  First, tax benefits are not equally
valuable to everyone.  Second, tax administrators do not have exper-
tise about energy policy.
1. Limited Market for Tax Benefits
When structured as tax expenditures, energy subsidies have less in-
fluence on some claimants.  For example, if these tax benefits are not
refundable, they have no value to those who pay no U.S. tax, includ-
ing nonprofits, loss corporations, and foreigners.233
These limits narrow the universe of investors for renewable
projects, raising their cost of capital.234  Although profitable utilities
low-income claimant.  It is Pareto improving to give this grant to the high-income claimant,
and to pay $800 in unrestricted cash to the low-income claimant, as long as the low-income
claimant prefers the flexibility of $800 in cash to $1000 for weatherization.
232 See Allcott et al., note 225, at 187, 190-91 (arguing that subsidies for energy-efficient
durable goods should be limited to low-income households, since they are more likely to
be credit constrained).
233 Likewise, if tax expenditures are structured as deductions instead of credits, the sub-
sidy varies with the claimant’s bracket.  In addition, energy tax expenditures generally are
subject to the passive loss rules (except for working interests in oil and gas and some cred-
its claimed by the real estate industry).  This means broad classes of taxpayers (individuals,
personal services firms, and closely held firms) can use them to shelter only passive in-
come.  Furthermore, some energy tax credits cannot reduce the alternative minimum tax.
IRC § 38(c).
234 See Michelle D. Layser, Improving Tax Incentives for Wind Energy Production:  The
Case for a Refundable Production Tax Credit, 81 Mo. L. Rev. 453, 460 (2016) (describing
the costs of raising “tax equity” and proposing a refundable credit as a way to avoid these
costs); see also, Michael Mendelsohn & John Harper, Nat’l Renewable Energy Laboratory,
§ 1603 Treasury Grant Expiration:  Industry Insight on Financing and Market Implications,
at iii (2012), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/53720.pdf (“This need for such specialized
investors constrains the availability of private capital for renewable energy projects, partic-
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and energy producers can fund these projects “in-house,” investors
from outside the energy industry are harder to recruit.  Nonprofits
and many individual investors cannot claim the tax benefits, as noted
above, and profitable public companies often are reluctant to commit
capital outside their core areas.  Because the pool of potential inves-
tors is limited, they can extract more favorable terms.235  In addition,
extra transaction costs sometimes have to be incurred to claim these
tax benefits.236  In response to these concerns, the government tempo-
rarily replaced some tax credits with direct grants (the so-called § 1603
credit) for projects begun before December 31, 2011.237
2. Drafting and Administering Tax Expenditures:  Mismatch in
Expertise
Another familiar challenge is that tax experts are not the right gov-
ernment officials to make judgments about energy policy.  This is a
good reason not to use the tax system for energy programs.
If the tax system is already doing some of the necessary work,
though, building on its existing responsibilities is plausible.  For exam-
ple, the tax system already collects a gasoline tax to fund the highway
trust fund.  If this tax is increased for environmental or national secur-
ity reasons, the existing administrative infrastructure can be used.
When new taxes or subsidies are added, however, other agencies
should draft and interpret the relevant provisions and resolve any pol-
icy issues that arise.  Or if a finite benefit has to be allocated among
competing claimants—a process Congress has used for some energy
tax expenditures, as well as for the low-income housing credit—agen-
cies with more expertise (such as the Department of Energy) should
make these judgments.238  The tax system’s role should be limited to
the ministerial function of dispensing or collecting the money.  In this
spirit, Senator Baucus’s proposals, discussed above,239 rely on the
ularly for projects that are developed by entities that are smaller, have less development
experience, or that seek to deploy new or less-proven technologies.”).
235 This was especially true during the financial crisis when many of the usual investors,
including Lehman brothers, were insolvent or unsure how profitable they would be.  Men-
delsohn & Harper, note 234, at iii (noting that the number of available tax equity investors
dropped from approximately twenty to approximately five in 2008-2009).
236 Felix Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits:  Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner, More Demo-
cratic Energy Future, 31 Yale J. on Reg. 303, 330-33 (2014).
237 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1603, 123 Stat. 115,
364 (2009).
238 For instance, this sort of process has been used for credits for gasification, coal, ad-
vanced nuclear projects, and other advanced energy projects.  For a discussion, see Daniel
Halperin, Incentives for Conservation Easements:  Charitable Deduction or Another Way,
74 L. & Contemp. Prob. 29, 47-49 (2011).
239 See notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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EPA instead of on the IRS to determine the carbon footprint of vari-
ous technologies, and thus the generosity of the relevant tax
expenditure.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The bottom line is that energy subsidies pursue worthy goals, but a
number of institutional design flaws undermine their effectiveness.
Four implications follow from this assessment:  First, the effects of en-
ergy on national security warrant more attention in the academic liter-
ature; second, carbon and gasoline taxes and tradeable permits have
distinct advantages over energy subsidies; third, given these advan-
tages, if we are unable to enact these instruments for political reasons,
we should look for variations that are more politically palatable;
fourth, if energy subsidies continue to be used, their design flaws need
to mitigated.  This Part highlights these implications in turn.
A. National Security
This Article has emphasized two risks to U.S. security when oil mar-
kets do not have slack capacity:  First, pressure increases on the
United States to police access to unstable or insecure exporters; sec-
ond, more revenue flows to geopolitical rivals.
While some government officials presumably focus on these issues,
the academic literature has neglected these costs on the theory that
their magnitude is too hard to estimate, or that only fundamental
shifts in energy markets can affect them.  Yet, difficulties in estimating
a cost are not a license to ignore it.  In addition, the “shale revolution”
is likely to affect the analysis in ways that are not yet fully understood.
In unpacking these effects, we should be precise about which energy
sources prompt national security concerns.  Given the newly abundant
supply of domestic natural gas, the national security argument for coal
and renewables has become correspondingly weaker.  Indeed, na-
tional security issues mainly arise with oil.
Efforts to enhance oil production in friendly and stable regions of-
fer national security advantages, although they have offsetting envi-
ronmental costs.  Efforts to reduce demand through conservation and
greater efficiency also yield national security benefits, while advancing
environmental objectives as well.  As a result, there is a strong na-
tional security argument for higher taxes (or a permit regime) on gas-
oline, aviation fuel, diesel, and other oil-based products.  There also
are reasons to favor producers that are friendly and stable (for exam-
ple, with a lower tax), but the challenges in administering this differ-
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entiated approach are significant.  More work is needed on these
important issues.
B. Pigouvian Taxes or Tradeable Permits Instead of Subsidies
This Article also shows why Pigouvian taxes or tradeable permits
are preferable to subsidies.  Several commentators have also come to
this conclusion, although the opposite view has supporters as well.240
In particular, subsidies have five weaknesses.
First, although taxes, permits, and subsidies all share the common
challenge of reaching all potential substitutes, this task is harder for
subsidies.  Covering all sources of harm (with taxes or permits) is eas-
ier than reaching all options for abating this harm (with subsidies).
Second, and relatedly, instead of trying to cover the waterfront in
this way, many green energy subsidies under current law seemingly
embrace the opportunity to “pick winners.”  But it is not clear that
government officials have the information, expertise, and incentives to
choose which technologies to favor, and they are subject to interest
group pressure in attempting to do so.
Third, unlike taxes and permits, subsidies often do not increase the
price of energy.  As a result, they fail to curtail overall demand.
Fourth, subsidies price harm avoided by the targeted activity, while
taxes and permits price harm caused by the targeted activity.  Know-
ing what harm is avoided is more difficult, since (by definition) it does
not happen.
Finally, if hydrocarbon producers expect viable substitutes for their
product to be developed in the future, they are likely to cut prices
today.  Taxes and permits, which raise the price of hydrocarbons,
counter this Hotelling effect more effectively than subsidies.
Given the advantages of taxes and permits over subsidies, the best
policy response is a menu of Pigouvian taxes or permits, along the
lines discussed above.  The environmental, economic, and national se-
curity stakes are high, and this approach is most effective in advancing
these goals.  Although it requires political courage for leaders to
adopt these policies, the policy payoff would be significant.
C. Compromises to Attract Political Support
If necessary, this approach can be modified somewhat in order to
attract more support.  This Section canvasses four ideas, some of
which are more familiar than others.
240 See generally Cohen et al., note 7.
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1. Free or Discounted Tradeable Permits
With a permit system, a familiar political compromise is to give
away some permits for free or at a discount.  This windfall can “buy
off” potential opponents, allowing previously unpriced externalities to
be internalized.  Unfortunately, though, the government loses revenue
in discounting permits.
2. Repeal of Subsidies for Hydrocarbons
If Congress cannot add a Pigouvian tax or a permit system, Con-
gress can get some of the same benefit by cutting existing subsidies for
energy it wants to discourage.  For instance, if hydrocarbon subsidies
are encouraging greater use of coal, oil, or natural gas, repealing or
cutting these subsidies would discourage consumption at the margin.
Admittedly, the extent to which these subsidies actually have in-
creased the use of hydrocarbons is unclear.  For example, the National
Research Council has concluded that these subsidies do not increase
GHGs, in part because they believe they mostly increase natural gas
production, which reduces GHGs when replacing coal.241
Assuming the National Research Council is correct, the implication
could be to eliminate only a subset of these subsidies.  For instance,
there should be environmental advantages (without offsetting national
security disadvantages) in eliminating the subsidy for coal.  Likewise,
there also may be national security advantages in narrowing the for-
eign tax credit regime—and, in particular, denying the credit for royal-
ties—so fewer U.S. tax dollars are redirected to geopolitical rivals.
3. A Petroleum Price Stabilization Plan
Another option, which I have proposed with Thomas Merrill in
other work, is a gas tax with two features to make it more politically
palatable.242  First, the tax would kick in only when gasoline prices fall
below a specified level.  The political advantage of this feature is that,
when prices are low, consumers should object less to a price increase.
Admittedly, this political advantage comes at a policy cost:  Exter-
nalities would not be internalized when the market price is above the
threshold.
Yet putting a floor on gasoline prices still helps address environ-
mental and national security costs in an important way:  Designing
more fuel-efficient cars is a multi-year process, and manufacturers are
241 Nat’l Research Council, note 2, at 25, 63.
242 Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn:  A
Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (2010).
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more wary of investing in these innovations if they worry that gasoline
prices will be low—so consumers will not be interested—by the time
the new cars come to market.243
A second feature to enhance the political prospects of this idea is a
rebate.  The government would not keep the revenue raised through
this program.  Instead, each American would receive a check, equal to
the tax paid by the average user of gasoline.244  For example, if $162.5
billion is raised, each of 325 million Americans would receive a $500
check, regardless of how much gasoline they used.245
This feature has two political advantages.  First, the regime can be
called a “price stabilization plan,” instead of a tax, since it does not
raise revenue.  Second, these checks should create a political constitu-
ency for the program.  Light users of gasoline would come out ahead –
since their rebate would exceed the tax they pay at the pump – so they
would want the program to continue.
While this proposal is designed as a gasoline tax, it could be broad-
ened to become a “standby” carbon tax, if other hydrocarbons are
included.  The levels for gasoline can be adjusted to account for na-
tional security harms, and other pollution risks can be priced in as
well.  Although this structure does not deliver all the policy benefits of
noncontingent Pigouvian taxes and permits, it is appealing if these
other options are politically unattainable.  Unlike the targeted subsi-
dies under current law, this approach does not increase the demand
for energy or rely on the government to bet on particular
technologies.
4. “Saving Gas” or “Saving the Climate” Credits
Another possibility is to embed a Pigouvian tax inside a lump sum
credit, so it can be framed as a “reward,” instead of a tax.  Claimants
would receive nothing if they used more than a certain amount of dis-
favored energy.  Using less would entitle them to a payment, which
becomes more generous as their usage declines.
243 A further concern is that a price floor would erode the incentive of gasoline produc-
ers or refiners to compete and cut costs.  But these incentives remain if the tax is computed
based on global crude prices, instead of local gasoline prices. Because the U.S. consumer
represents only a fraction of the global market for crude, the U.S. tax should not constrain
this price, in the way it could if implemented at the local level.  For these and other imple-
mentation issues, see id.
244 The lump sum nature of this rebate has a policy price:  Congress forgoes the opportu-
nity to use this revenue to replace distortive taxes.
245 Another option is to vary these rebates by region, given variations in density and the
availability of mass transit.  For instance, the rebate in New York City could be $400, and
the rebate in rural Texas could be $600.
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For instance, assume a “saving gas credit” offered $1000 per year
minus an amount based on how much gasoline they used (for exam-
ple, $1 per gallon).  Those who used no gasoline would receive a $1000
credit.  Those who used the average amount (800 gallons)246 would
receive $200,247 and those who used 20% more than the average (960
gallons) would receive only $40.248  This sliding-scale credit essentially
fuses a $1000 lump sum payment with a $1 per gallon gasoline tax.
Although structured as a subsidy (at least in form), this sliding-scale
credit discourages the use of gasoline.249  In effect, it is a gasoline tax
“in disguise.”
The credit can be expanded to mimic a carbon tax.  Specifically, a
“saving the climate” credit would reward using not just less gasoline,
but also less natural gas, coal, and other sources of GHGs as well.
Embedding a Pigouvian tax in a lump sum payment has a notable
political advantage:  The program can be called a “reward” or “bo-
nus,” instead of a “tax.”250
At the same time, this sliding scale credit shares two policy advan-
tages of a tax or permit.  First, it creates an incentive to use less gaso-
line or emit fewer GHGs.  Second, the government does not favor one
abatement method over another.  For instance, the “saving gas” credit
offers the same $1 reward for saving a gallon by telecommuting, buy-
ing a hybrid, driving more slowly, carpooling, or some other way.
Even so, compared with Pigouvian taxes or tradeable permits, these
credits have four policy disadvantages.  First, for households that ex-
haust the credit by using too much gasoline or emitting too much CO2,
the credit offers no incentive to curtail usage.251  Second, the need for
revenue, discussed above, can have policy as well as political costs, at
246 The U.S. Energy Information Agency estimated that households spent $2912 on gas-
oline in 2012, at an average price of $3.70 per gallon.  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S.
Household Expenditures for Gasoline Account for Nearly 4% of Pretax Income (Feb. 4,
2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=9831.  This is approximately 800
gallons per household.
247 $1000 minus $800, which is $1 for each of the 800 gallons.
248 The $1000 credit would be reduced by (960 x $1) or $960.
249 Admittedly, this structure is in ways more like a tax than a subsidy, and that of
course is the point of it.  Notably, though, Mitchell Polinsky has used a subsidy with a
structure like this to generalize about problems with subsidies.  See generally A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Notes on the Symmetry of Taxes and Subsidies in Pollution Control, 12 Can. J.
Econ. 75, 77-78 (1979) (considering whether subsidies for pollution abatement increase
entry into polluting industries).
250 Even so, this political edge can be dulled, to an extent, by a credit’s budgetary im-
pact.  For instance, if the average household uses 800 gallons of gasoline each year, the
average “saving gas” credit would be $200.  If it is claimed by each of the 116 million
households in the United States, the annual cost would be approximately $23 billion.
251 In the example, a claimant receives no credit once she uses her 1000th gallon.  There
is no further disincentive to use the 1001st or, for that matter, the 2000th.  With a $1 per
gallon gas tax, by contrast, there is always a $1 disincentive to use each additional gallon.
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least if revenue is raised with especially inefficient taxes.  Notably,
there is a trade-off between these two factors.  Increasing the credit
amount (for example, from $1000 to $1100) enables the credit to apply
to more heavy users, but also increases its budgetary cost.
Third, compared with these credits, Pigouvian taxes offer more fre-
quent reminders to curtail usage:  They are imposed each time the
relevant type of energy is purchased.  In contrast, if these “saving”
credits are included on the annual tax return, they are computed only
once a year.  This difference could cause the credits to be less salient,
and thus less effective at encouraging abatement.
Fourth, unlike Pigouvian taxes, “saving” credits require households
to track their energy consumption.  For instance, to compute the “sav-
ing gas” credit, claimants have to know how much gasoline they use,
so they can reduce the lump sum credit by the appropriate amount.
This information is difficult for claimants to compile and for the gov-
ernment to verify.
One approach is to require claimants to buy gas with a special credit
card that tracks purchases, and to prohibit (and penalize) cash and
other off-the-books purchases.
Another approach is for gas stations to report each purchase of gas-
oline on a national database, including gallons purchased, name on
the driver’s license, car’s license plate, and the like.  An obvious risk,
though, is that taxpayers would use fake driver’s licenses or would
bribe vendors to understate their purchases.
Still another possibility is to track the miles a claimant drives, in-
stead of gasoline usage.  For instance, service stations can be required
to issue certified mileage statements in conducting annual emissions
inspections.  This mileage can then be divided by the average miles
per gallon of the claimant’s vehicle, which the government already
posts online.252  Unfortunately, these averages are an approximation
at best, since mileage varies with speed and driving conditions.  Yet
this approach has the advantage of piggybacking on inspections and
disclosure that already exists, instead of requiring a new reporting
mechanism.  Obviously, none of these strategies is ideal.  Solving this
problem is a key challenge for these credits—and, notably, one that
Pigouvian taxes do not face.253
252 2013 Fuel Economy Guide, note 182, at 5-36.
253 In theory, a gasoline tax would present the same challenge if it were collected on the
taxpayer’s return, instead of at the pump.
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D. Better Institutional Design for Energy Subsidies
Given the advantages of Pigouvian taxes or tradeable permits over
energy subsidies, the best solution is the menu of taxes or permits de-
scribed above.  If it is politically unattainable, variations of taxes or
permits that are more politically plausible should be considered, even
if the policy case for them is less compelling.
If this strategy fails—in other words, if Congress is stuck with en-
ergy subsidies—better institutional design is needed.  Specifically,
Congress should fix, or at least mitigate, six problems discussed in
Parts IV and V.
First, in deciding which technologies to favor and how generous to
be, Congress needs to account for hidden costs.  For instance, al-
though driving electric vehicles does not emit GHGs, manufacturing
them does—indeed, more than gasoline-powered vehicles.
Second, subsidies should not single out specific technologies.  A
broader formulation encourages competition and offers options to
heterogeneous consumers.  For instance, instead of a credit for hy-
brids, Congress can enhance fuel efficiency more cost effectively with
a credit for any car with sufficiently high gas mileage.
Third, subsidies should target results, instead of proxies.  To avoid
perverse effects, such as subsidizing energy that is not used, Congress
needs to reward the right behavior.  For instance, the goal should not
be to produce electricity from wind per se, but to replace electricity
from coal or gas.  If using a proxy is unavoidable (for example, for
administrability reasons), conditions should be included to foreclose
perverse outcomes.  For instance, a subsidy that rewards production
(instead of profit or revenue) should be available only when energy
sells for a minimum (or positive) price.
Fourth, climate and national security externalities are global.
Therefore, policies targeting these issues are more effective if coordi-
nated with other countries.
Fifth, Congress should either not use the tax system to deliver these
subsidies or should address familiar limitations in doing so.  For in-
stance, since tax administrators are not experts in environmental or
national security policy, experts in these areas should formulate and
interpret the criteria for the subsidy, leaving tax experts the ministe-
rial responsibility of dispensing funds.
Sixth, energy policy objectives and distribution generally should be
pursued separately.  On one hand, if the goal is to improve national
security or the environment, subsidizing low-income claimants ordina-
rily is less cost-effective; they have less capacity in their budgets, and
thus are less responsive.  On the other hand, if the goal is to channel
resources to low-income households, green energy subsidies are a less
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efficient currency than cash, which allows claimants to pursue their
own priorities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Energy can have profound effects on our environment, economy,
and national security.  Unfortunately, the hodgepodge of energy sub-
sidies under current law underperforms in a number of ways.  The
goals are worthy—indeed, many are compelling—but these subsidies
suffer from a range of design flaws.
This Article has four main implications for energy policy.  First, the
economics literature on energy needs to incorporate national security
in the analysis, something it so far has failed to do.  Second, Pigouvian
taxes and tradeable permits are likely to be better than subsidies.
Third, since taxes and permits face political challenges in the United
States, Congress should consider variations that have better political
prospects, even if their policy merits are not as strong.  Fourth, if Con-
gress is stuck with subsidies, it can still improve on current law in a
number of ways.  For instance, Congress should broaden the subsidies
and target results instead of proxies.  There is ample room for im-
provement.  This is fortunate, since the stakes are high.
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